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Abstract 
Healthcare-associated infections, in particular those caused by 
antibiotic-resistant organisms, are a major cause of morbidity, mortality and 
increased cost to healthcare providers and MRSA are, in terms of 
prevalence, by far the most significant resistant organisms in the United 
Kingdom as well as many other countries worldwide. 
Isolation of hospital patients, usually in single rooms, is intended to interrupt 
the transmission of potential pathogens between patients and/or staff. Risk 
assessment is used to determine whether individual patients with potentially 
transmissible pathogens, including MRSA, should be isolated in single 
rooms. However, limited isolation room availability and/or operational needs 
may compromise this process and this has contributed to a general 
perception that although isolation may be recommended, in many cases it is 
not achieved due to a lack of facilities and conflicting priorities for the use of 
those facilities. 
Despite it being considered as standard practice the evidence for the 
efficacy of isolation in a single room in preventing the transmission of MRSA 
is limited. 
An initial study examined, prospectively, the incidence of isolation failure in a 
large UK National Health Service hospital and the relationship between the 
rate of 'failure to isolate' of patients from whose clinical samples MRSA had 
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been identified and the rate of MRSA identified from samples sent for clinical 
purposes, per ward. A subsequent study compared the transmission of 
MRSA from index cases who were isolated and those who were not isolated 
with a cohort of contacts who were immediately adjacent to them. 
The results of these studies demonstrate that 'failure to isolate' is a frequent 
occurrence; isolation requirements were not met in 22% of cases and that 
there was a significant correlation between failing to isolate patients with 
MRSA, and rates of MRSA identified from samples sent for clinical purposes 
(Spearman's p=0.596, p<0.001). Conversely there was no significant 
difference in the MRSA acquisition rates in the contacts of people with 
MRSA who were not isolated vs. index cases who were isolated. Risk factors 
for MRSA acquisition in multivariate analysis were: exposure to antibiotics 
(quinolones and macrolides), presence of a nasogastric tube, dermatological 
conditions and the index case being risk-assessed as requiring isolation. 
Further research is needed into the efficacy of isolation in preventing the 
hospital transmission of MRSA. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Healthcare-associated infection 
Healthcare-associated infection (HCAI) has replaced the traditional term 
'hospital-acquired infection' (HAI) because of the increasing delivery of 
healthcare in settings other than hospitals e. g. general practitioners' 
surgeries and in people's own homes. The term can be used to describe any 
infection acquired through exposure to any health intervention such as 
surgery, medical treatment or care activities e. g. nursing or physiotherapy. 
The overall prevalence of HCAl has not been measured due to the complex 
nature of healthcare delivery; however, there are a number of studies that 
have reported the prevalence and incidence of HAI. In the developed world 
the reported prevalence of all HAls is in the range of five to ten percent. ' 
Preliminary results of the United Kingdom (UK) third National Prevalence 
Survey of Healthcare-Associated Infections in Acute Hospitals conducted in 
2006 give the overall rate of HAI in acute hospitals in England as 8.19% 
(95% confidence intervals 7.97 - 8.41 %). 
2 This figure is little changed from 
that of 9% found in the second National Prevalence Survey ten years 
earlier; 3 however any comparisons between the two studies can only be 
made with extreme caution as the methodologies employed, including the 
definitions of infection, were different. 
The overall impact of HAI on morbidity and mortality is unknown but it has 
been estimated that around 5,000 deaths a year in the UK may be 
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attributable to HAI and that HAI may contribute substantially to a further 
15 '000.4 The economic impact of HAI has been studied by Plowman and 
colleagues who, through extrapolation from one district general hospital, 
estimated the cost of HAI in England to be -E930 million per annum (hospital 
5 
costs only). The authors recognise that this figure is a relatively crude 
estimate due to the difficulties in such extrapolation and, additionally, this 
study excluded day-case activity, which is becoming greater over time, 
though only slowly; 6 nevertheless it gives an indication of the burden of HAI 
on National Health Service (NHS) finances. 
1.2. Healthcare-associated infections caused by 
antimicrobial resistant organisms 
Organisms that are resistant to antimicrobial agents present a significant 
threat to public health. 7 In particular, the emergence of multiply 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria as significant nosocomial pathogens is a major 
threat to the safe and successful provision of healthcare. Members of a 
number of bacterial genera that cause HCAl exhibit resistance to antibiotics 
including: multiply-resistant staphylococci, glycopeptide-resistant enterococci 
and multiply-resistant Gram negative bacilli including those that produce 
extended-spectrum P-lactamases (ESBLs). 
Although there are data to indicate increasing resistance in a number of 
species including; Enterococcus faecium, Escherichia coli, Klebsiella spp., 
Enterobacter spp., and Acinetobacter spp.: the most significant 
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multiply-resistant bacteria, in terms of both prevalence and impact, are 
meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus. 89 
1.3. Staphylococcus aureus and meticillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) 
1.3.1. Staphylococcus aureus 
Staphylococcus aureus is a ubiquitous, opportunistic, Gram-positive, 
coagulase-positive bacterium that colonises up to fifty five percent of healthy 
adults 10 11 with colonisation rates that are twenty five to fifty percent higher 
in certain groups of hospital patients and staff. 12 
S. aureus can be isolated from a number of body sites including the axilla, 
perineurn and areas of damaged skin but is most commonly found in the 
anterior nares and elimination from the nose leads to its subsequent 
disappearance from other body sites. 10 In addition to colonisation, S. aureus 
causes a range of infections from simple skin lesions through the whole 
range of community- and healthcare-associated infections to life-threatening 
pneumonia and septicaernia. S. aureus, with or without resistance to 
meticillin, are among the commonest organisms found in a range of HCAI, in 
particular surgical-site infection 13 and vascular catheter-related bloodstream 
infection. 14 In addition to opportunistic infections and HCAI, some strains of 
S. aureus are the cause of specific toxin mediated disease such as 
staphylococcal food poisoning, blistering skin disease, including scalded skin 
syndrome, and toxic shock syndrome. 
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1.3.2. Antibiotic resistance in S. aureus 
S. aureus exhibits no natural antibiotic resistance but strains have acquired 
resistance to many agents as they have been developed and used in clinical 
practice. Less than five years after the earliest use of penicillin, resistance to 
this drug through production of penicillinase (a P-lactamase) was, by 1946, 
already found in 6% of S. aureus clinical isolates; this figure growing to over 
50% by 1948.15 Currently, more than 90% of S. aureus are resistant to 
penicillin. 9 Livermore summarises the rapid emergence of resistance in 
S. aureus to other natural antibiotics, including chloramphenicol, 
erythromycin, streptomycin and tetracycline, all of which were rendered 
ineffective against particular strains before the 1960s. 16 
The penicillinase-stable P-lactarn antibiotics were developed in the early 
1960s, these included methicillin (now meticillin), nafcillin and flucloxacillin. 
Resistance to these agents, and thus the emergence of MRSA, occurred 
very quickly, with meticillin resistance being reported within a year of the 
drug becoming commercially available. 17 This bears a remarkable historical 
similarity to the first report of resistance to penicillin in S. aureus which was 
also within one year of its first use. 18 
Strains of S. aureus acquire meticillin resistance through chromosomal 
incorporation of the mecA gene. The mecA gene is incorporated within the 
Staphylococcal Chromosomal Cassette, SCCmec, a large, mobile genetic 
element that is known to occur in five types ranging in size from 20 to 67 kb; 
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mecA encodes PBP2', an additional penicillin binding protein in the cell wall 
of MRSA. This effectively prevents penicillinase-stable P-lactam antibiotics 
acting by providing an additional penicillin binding protein that has reduced 
affinity for, and thereby reduced binding to, P-lactam drugs, thus permitting 
synthesis of peptidoglycan. 19 In addition to the penicillinase-stable 
penicillins this mechanism confers resistance to all P-lactam antibiotics 
including cephalosporins and carbapenems. Resistance to other families of 
antibiotic varies with different isolates and is dependent on which other 
antibiotic resistance genes have been acquired and are carried by the 
resistant strain. A recent survey of UK microbiology laboratories identified 
that 92% of MRSA strains were resistant to quinolones and 72% to 
macrolides. 
20 
Once it had emerged, meticillin resistance spread rapidly, Grundmann et al. 
summarise the situation by 1967 when MRSA had been reported from four 
countries in Europe including England, 21 where in one large general hospital 
MRSA accounted for almost 10% of all S. aureus isolates. 22 At that time, 
MRSA were reported from India and Australia as well as from Europe. 
However, the incidence in Europe then declined during the 1970s, falling 
16 
close to nil by the early 1980s. Ayliffe suggests that this decline may have 
been due to improvements in antibiotic control and infection control during 
this period. 
22 
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By the mid 1980s isolates of MRSA were re-emerging. These isolates were 
characterised by gentarnicin resistance. The strain, known in the UK as 
( epidemic' or 'EMRSA' 1 was reported from a number of countries including 
the USA, Republic of Ireland, Australia and the UK. 16 21 23 Epidemic strains 
of MRSA in the UK were numbered sequentially as they were identified, and 
are described as those that had spread to two or more patients in two or 
more hospitals. In the late 1980s EIVIRSA 3 was common in the UK and by 
the mid 1990s this strain, along with EMRSA 15 and EMRSA 16, were the 
principal strains affecting UK hospitals. 24 Recently, a putative EMRSA 17 
has been described in the UK with the specific phenotypic characteristic of 
reduced susceptibility to glycopeptides. 25 
In the UK, and in many parts of southern and central Europe (though not 
northern Europe) and in other developed countries around the world, the 
prevalence of MRSA rose dramatically through the 1990s and into the early 
2000s. Johnson and colleagues report that during this period the proportion 
of S. aureus bacteraernias reported to the various UK surveillance systems 
26 
rose from < 2% to around 40%. Through intense public, media and political 
interest, this rise led to a mandatory surveillance system for MRSA 
bacteraernia and a mandatory reduction target for NHS Trusts in England. 
27 
28 Since the inception of these measures the proportion of S. aureus 
bacteraernias in England that are MRSA has remained stable at around 
40%. 29 
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Recent work, using multi-locus sequence typing (MLST) and DNA 
microarray analysis, has established more precisely the worldwide evolution 
of MRSA. Meticillin resistance had been thought previously to have spread 
from a single-meticillin resistant strain that evolved from an epidemic strain 
of meticillin-sensitive S. aureus (MSSA); however, MLST studies have 
concluded that meticillin resistance has been genetically transferred, through 
horizontal transfer of SCCmec to sensitive S. aureus on at least five 
occasions since its emergence. 30 
In recent years a small number of reports have identified strains of MRSA 
with reduced susceptibility to glycopeptide antibiotics. 31-36 The definitions of 
reduced susceptibility have been described as confusing by the most recent 
UK guidance on susceptibility testing in S. aureus and the authors 
recommended the use of the terms: VISA (vancomycin), GISA 
(glycopeptide) and TISA (teicoplanin) for isolates exhibiting homogenous 
low-level, intermediate, resistance to these agents and the term VRSA for 
high-level resistance to vancomycin i. e. MIC > 32 mg/L. 20 In addition to 
these reports, others have reported heterogeneous resistance where, 
despite an MIC within the susceptible range, sub-populations within a strain 
exhibit reduced susceptibility to vancomycin; the clinical significance of these 
findings is not clear. 34 37 38 As well as resistance to systemic antibiotics 
there is evidence of established and increasing resistance to mupirocin, a 
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topical antibiotic used to eradicate staphylococci from sites of colonisation, 
particularly the anterior nares. 20 
In recent years, there have been reports of an entirely new development in 
the epidemiology of MRSA. Historically, the overwhelming majority of cases 
of MRSA have been attributable to contact with healthcare, usually hospitals, 
but latterly there have been reports of MRSA infections in healthy adults and 
children without previous contact with hospitals or healthcare of any 
description and without any known risk factors for MRSA. 39 These cases 
have presented as serious skin and soft-tissue infection S40 including 
necrotising fasci itiS 
41 
and, more rarely, as a necrotising pneumonia . 
42 
These community-acquired strains of MRSA (CA-MRSA) are distinct from 
hospital-acquired strains in a number of ways including- increased virulence 
due to the presence of the Panton-Valentine leukocidin (PVL) and a lack of 
genes encoding resistance to a range of antibiotics other than those in the 
P-lactam family. 
Research by Robinson et al. 
43 
using MLST has suggested that CA-MRSA 
strains circulating currently are the re-emergence, with the addition of 
meticillin resistance, of the notorious strain of MSSA known as 'phage type 
80/81 which caused a pandemic of both hospital- and community-acquired 
infection during the 1950s and 1960s. There have been large numbers of 
cases of CA-MRSA reported in North America , 
4041 44-51 
as well reports from 
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Europe 52-54 and Australasia , 
55 56 however CA-MRSA currently remains rare 
in England and Wales 57 and it will not be considered further. 
1.3.3. Identification and typing of MRSA 
UK recommendations for both routine and rapid identification methods for 
MRSA in both clinical and screening samples, as well as tests for antibiotic 
susceptibility, have been published recently. 58 Typing techniques for S 
aureus and MRSA can be divided into phenotypic and genotypic techniques. 
Phenotypic techniques e. g. antibiograrn comparison and bacteriophage 
typing, are the traditional methods and are still widely used. Comparisons of 
antibiotic susceptibility patterns may serve as a useful indicator of 
relatedness leading to selection of isolates for further typin g 24. Such 
usefulness, however, is limited as genetically-u n related isolates may have 
the same antibiograM 59 and those that are genetically related may have 
small differences in their antibiogram. 60 Similarly, Bacteriophage typing has 
been criticised because of the number of isolates that are non-typeable by 
this technique 59 although this problem can be reduced by such adjuncts as 
typing at 1000 x RTD, heat treatment at 480 C and 'heat shocking' at 
55-56' C. 61 62 
The available molecular or genotypic techniques for S. aureus and MRSA 
typing are Pulsed Field Gel Electrophoresis (PFGE), MILST, SCCmec typing 
and spa typing, which is a single locus typing method based on the 
S. aureus Protein A gene (spa). PFGE is widely used and is considered the 
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reference standard for MRSA typing, particularly for local epidemiological 
investigations; however the need for subjective interpretation makes 
comparisons between laboratories difficult, although improvements in 
comparison software have reduced these problems. The technique involves 
digestion of MRSA chromosomal DNA, typically using the digestion enzyme 
Smal, and subsequent separation of the digestion fragments by an adapted 
agarose gel electrophoresis technique. 63-65 The interpretation of the PFGE 
band patterns to determine if isolates are epidemiologically related has been 
described by Tenover et al. 
66 
MILST uses DNA sequence determination of fragments (approximately 
500 bp) of seven housekeeping genes, the sequences identified are 
compared with known allelic profiles and given a sequence type. MLST is 
considered less discriminatory than PFGE for local epidemiological 
investigation but has been used successfully to identify the global 
epidemiology of MRSA. 
3067 
SCCmec typing, using polymerase chain reaction (PCR) techniques, 
identifies the isolates according to which of five currently known SCCmec 
types they carry. This information combined with resistance data (/. e. 
meticillin susceptibility) and MLST type has been proposed as an 
67 
international standard nomenclature for S. aureus including MRSA . 
Because it involves the sequence determination of only a single locus, spa 
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typing has been proposed as a simple technique that can be used locally, 
that is discriminatory enough for studies of both molecular evolution and 
local epidemiological investigations. 5963 
1.3.4. Treatment of MRSA infection 
Guidance on the prophylaxis and treatment of MRSA infections has been 
published recently. 20 Although treatment choices may be limited, the 
authors recommend a number of different agents depending on the 
susceptibility patterns of the MRSA strains encountered; for serious and 
life-threatening infections, however, the glycopeptide antibiotic vancomycin 
is recommended, either as sole agent or in combination with rifampicin or 
fusidic acid. An alternative option to vancomycin and the agent of choice 
where there is reduced susceptibility to glycopeptides is the relatively 
recently developed agent linezolid but holding other novel agents such as 
quinupristin/dalfopristin in reserve has also been recommended. 
1.3.5. Epidemiology of MRSA colonisation and infection 
1.3.5.1. Risk factors for MRSA colonisation and infection 
MRSA carriage in the general population, outside of nursing homes, 
hospitals and other care settings, is generally low, whether or not the 
prevalence in healthcare facilities 
is low 68 or high. 
116970 The epidemiology 
of the spread of MRSA both within and between healthcare institutions is 
complex; the emergence of MRSA de novo is considered to be a rare event 
and the majority of cases worldwide are due to the intra- and inter-hospital 
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spread of a relatively small number of epidemic strains, as described by 
67 Robinson and Enright. 
A review by Safdar and Maki 71 identified what they describe as "impressive 
commonality" of risk factors for colonisation and infection with a number of 
epidemiologically-important bacteria including antibiotic-resistant S. aureus, 
enterococci and Gram-negative bacilli as well as Clostridium difficile and 
Candida spp. This suggests that host factors and medical interventions are 
as at least as important as organism factors in the acquisition and spread of 
pathogens. 
Colonisation frequently precedes infection 10 72 73 and a number of studies 
have identified putative risk factors for colonisation in a variety of patient 
populations. Nouwen et aL describe the determinants of S. aureus nasal 
carriage and note that host factors including; ethnic groups, gender, age and 
the presence of underlying diseases affect the likelihood of carriage. '0 
Independent risk factors identified using multivariate analysis for MRSA 
acquisition for in-patients on general wards include: prolonged hospital 
length-of-stay (LOS), 74 75 pressure sores, 74 physiothera py, 74 surgical and 
74 75 76 76 invasive procedures, intensity of care, number of ward transfers , 
antibiotic thera py, 75-77 underlying illnesses , 
75 78 older age , 
75 79 previous 
hospital isation, 77-80 residence in a nursing home 78-80 and HIV infection. 77 In 
2005, Hidron et al. also identified a diagnosis of skin or soft-tissue infection 
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on admission to hospital as an independent risk factor for MRSA colonisation 
which reflects the emergence of CA-MRSA in North America. 77 
Risk factors identified using multivariate analysis for clinical infection with 
MRSA are: MRSA colonisation, 73 nursing home care, 81 prior 
hospitalisation 
, 
81 82 increasing age , 
81 intensive care, 83 surgical wound s, 82 
83 pressure sores , 
83 intravenous catheterisation , 
83 increased LO S, 82 84 
antibiotic thera py, 82 84 enteral feeding . 
82 In surgical patients specifically, risk 
factors include: gastrointestinal malignancy, sepsis , 
85 discharge to long-term 
care (which may be a surrogate for admission from long-term care) and 
duration of post-operative antibiotic therapy. 86 The presence of a 
nasogastric tube has been identified as a risk factor for MRSA acquisition 
and infection but only in univariate ana IySiS. 83 87 88 
A number of studies have examined the risk factors for MRSA bacteraemia; 
most have used MSSA bacteraemia as the comparator and the 
methodologies used included both prospective and retrospective 
data 
collection. The risk factors identified were similar to those above; 
intravascular catheterisation , 
89-9 1 recent previous hospitalisation, 
92 93 
assisted living', 9293 critical care, 
90 urinary catheterisation, 
91 infection at the 
surgical site, 91 older age and underlying illness. 
94 
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Risk factors for colonisation and infection have also been identified in 
specific patient populations; in intensive care patients the following factors 
have been identified: colonisation pressure (the presence of other MRSA 
95 96 97 98 97 colonised patients) , 
increased LOS, history of hospitalisation, 
surgery, 97 98 skin lesions (including pressure sores), 97 99 antibiotic 
therapy, 96 98 central venous catheterisation, 96 tracheostomy and enteral 
nutrition. 99 
Other patient groups studied include in-patients infected with HIV in whom 
prior hospital isation, antibiotic therapy, invasive procedures and cannulae, 
dermatological conditions and a low CD4 count were independently 
associated either with colonisation or infection with MRSA, 100 101 
elderly-care populations (who require assisted living, or have antibiotic 
exposure or recent hospitalisation) 102 103 and infants in a well-infant nursery 
in whom circumcision and the use of lignocaine injections were identified as 
being associated with MRSA colonisation. 104 This latter study and a study by 
Skiest et al. 105 of MRSA vs. metici Ili n-susceptible S. aureus (MSSA) 
infections, in which risk factors for MRSA included ethnicity 
(Africa n-Ame rica n) and homelessness, again reflect the changing 
epidemiology of MRSA infection in places, such as the United States of 
America (USA) where community-acquired strains of MRSA have become a 
prominent cause of clinical infection. 
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Other studies have identified organisational factors that may affect the 
incidence of MRSA. Vicca 106 describes a significant temporal relationship 
between peaks of nursing staff workload and an increased number of MRSA 
cases. The correlation (Pearson's p=0.1146; p<0.001) may reflect the 
complexity of MRSA transmission in which nurse-patient ratio may only be a 
small contributing factor. This finding is supported by Bignardi & Askew, 107 
however their data compare the prevalence of MRSA, and Clostridium 
difficile, with finished consultant episodes rather than direct nurse-patient 
ratios and could simply reflect increased overall activity rather than relative 
increases in workload. Blatnik & Lesnicar 108 measured MRSA transmission 
and the workload of nursing staff prospectively in an intensive care unit using 
a recognised workload scale, over a two-year period. They demonstrated a 
convincing correlation between increased workload and increased MRSA 
transmission (p < 0.001; F test). This finding is supported indirectly by the 
work of Huggonet et al. 109 who, in a prospective cohort study of nearly 2000 
ICU patients, found that a higher 24-hour nurse-patient ratio was significantly 
associated with a lower incidence of all nosocomial infections. 
Mathematical modelling of MRSA transmission in ICUs has produced 
conflicting data on the impact of staffing levels, with one model identifying 
relative staff deficit as significantly associated with transmission (adjusted 
rate ratio for transmission 1.05,95% CI 1.02 to 1.09)"0 and another similar 
report finding that the impact of increasing staffing, unless combined with 
strict staff-patient cohorting, could actually increase transmission. 
111 It has 
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been proposed that reduced staffing leads to reduced patient contact as only 
essential tasks are undertaken, thus leading to fewer opportunities for cross 
infection. 112 Because of the nature of critical care nursing, i. e. one-to-one 
care being the norm, it is unclear as to whether these findings could be 
generalised to other care settings. 
Borg 113 describes a significant correlation between bed occupancy and 
numbers of MRSA cases over two years (r = 0.463; p<0.05) and describes 
an anecdotal use of extra beds with smaller bed spaces at times of peak 
occupancy. A causal relationship is implied; however the data could be 
interpreted alternatively as increased numbers of cases of MRSA leading to 
higher bed occupancy or as both higher bed occupancy and increased 
cases being confounded by, for example, the admission of more severely ill 
patients. A potential relationship between bed occupancy and nosocomial 
MRSA transmission is, however, plausible and of some concern in the UK 
where bed occupancy rates average 95%. 1 14 The hypotheses that increasing 
the numbers of beds at the expense of the space between them increases 
the risk of MRSA transmission is supported by the earlier work of Kibbler et 
al., 115 who found that the relative risk of colonisation with MRSA through 
adding an extra bed to four bedded bays was 3.15 (p < 0.005; y, 
2)- 
Cunningham et al. 116 used national data for Northern Ireland to identify a 
significant correlation between MRSA infection rates and both bed 
occupancy and bed turnover interval, the latter association being the 
stronger of the two. 
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1.3.5.2. Exposure to antibiotics as a risk factor for MRSA 
collonisation and infection. 
As previously noted, meticillin resistance in S. aureus is rarely the result of 
de novo bacterial mutation in response to the presence of antibiotics; 
however many studies have highlighted the link between prescription of 
antibiotics and MRSA, as both a risk factor for individual patients and a 
driver for increasing prevalence in healthcare facilities. It is also true that, in 
Europe, on the whole, those countries with the lowest rates of MRSA 
infection also have low rates of antibiotic prescribing, although the UK, which 
has relatively high rates of MRSA infection has rates of prescribing that are 
almost as low as in Scandinavia and the Netherlands: areas with a notably 
low number of MRSA infections. 117-119 
A number of classes of antibiotic have been implicated as risk factors for 
MRSA colonisation and infection including macrolides, 
82 85 100 120 (all) 
89 100 120-122 85 89 100 120 p-lactams , aminoglycosides, clindamycin, 
100 
85 85 
carbapenems, 100 aztreonam 100 and tetracycline. The classes that have 
shown the most consistent association with MRSA incidence, however, are 
the cephalosporins (in particular, the third-generation agents) and the 
quinolones. Fukatsu et al. 123 identified a significant temporal correlation 
between prescriptions of third-generation cephalosporins and MRSA surgical 
(P ,: ý 0.01; 72 site infections ,) 
however the study was retrospective and 
longitudinal and no attempt was made to assess the impact of other factors 
on MRSA incidence. Hill et al. 124 in a small case-control study identified a 
Page 25 of 195 
significant risk for MRSA acquisition associated with administration of a 
cephalosporin (p = 0.04; Fisher's exact test). The authors give limited 
information about the study and it is possible that the study was insufficiently 
powerful to identify a significant difference between cases and controls in 
other risk factors for MRSA. For example, there was a difference in the 
proportion of patients with urinary catheters (65% in cases vs. 41% in 
controls) but, in this small sample, this was not statistically significant. 
In a seven-year hospital wide study, Donegan et al. 121 identified a significant 
correlation between prescriptions of third-generation cephalosporins and the 
incidence of nosocomial MRSA bacteraernia. Again, there is no assessment 
of other factors that may have had an impact on MRSA bacteraernias over 
this period. 
In a large multi-centre study, Crowcroft et al. 122 used multivariate analysis to 
identify a highly significant correlation between use of the third-generation 
cephalosporins; ceftazidime and cefsulodin and nosocomial MRSA 
(regression coefficient 0.38; p=0.0003). The same study also identified a 
significant correlation with the use of quinolones (regression coefficient 0.36; 
p=0.05). Quinolones were also implicated in the study by Hill et al. 
described above but the risk was not significant (p = 0.16; Fisher's exact 
test); however this may be again be due to the small sample size and 
consequent lack of statistical power. Chiang et al. 125, in a case-control 
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study, identified levofloxacin use as an independent predictor of nosocomial 
MRSA infection (OR 2-8), the authors give limited information about their 
methods so the reliability of these data is difficult to assess. Dziekan et al. 76 
in a case-control study and using multivariate analysis found that quinolone 
therapy was a significant independent risk factor for nosocomial MRSA 
(p = 0.025, conditional logistic regression). 
In a post-hoc evaluation of a study designed to evaluate the effectiveness of 
nasal mupirocin in eradicating MRSA, previous receipt of a quinolone was an 
independent risk factor for persistent carriage of MRSA. 126 A case control 
study by Graffunder and Venezia 82 using logistic regression analysis again 
identified, levofloxacin, both in absolute terms (p < 0.001; 7,2 of the likelihood 
ratio) and in terms of the number of grams administered (p = 0.003; Y, 2 of the 
likelihood ratio ), as independently associated with risk of MRSA infection vs. 
MSSA infection. The use of patients with MSSA bacteraemia as controls 
instead of patients with no disease has been criticised as having the 
potential to overestimate the association between antibiotic use and MRSA 
acquisition. 127 
Muller et al. 120 used an ecological approach to study the relationship 
between antimicrobial use and MRSA acquisition by 'unit' (wards and 
departments). Multivariate analysis showed a significant independent 
association with MRSA acquisition for all classes of antibiotics studied, 
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2 including quinolones and cephalosporins (p for both < 0.01; of the 
likelihood ratio). The authors also noted that only these two classes of 
antibiotics exhibited a linear dose-effect relationship between usage and 
MRSA incidence. 
The study by LeBlanc et al. 128 identified, through retrospective review of 
hospital records, the risk of healthcare-associated MRSA colonisation and 
infection related to previous administration of antimicrobial drugs. The 
authors found that, of the antimicrobials studied and, after adjustment using 
regression analysis, only quinolones increased the risk of colonisation and 
infection (p for both < 0.05; Cox regression analyis). 
Two studies have been specifically designed to examine the hypothesis that 
quinolones increase the risk of MRSA colonisation and/or infection. Weber et 
al. 129 used a case-case-control group methodology (essentially, two 
parallel case-control studies) as a more robust method of determining risk in 
studies of antimicrobial resistance. The results of their multivariate analysis 
results show both ciprofloxacin (p < 0.0001; y, 2 of the likelihood ratio) and 
levofloxacin (p = 0.005; X2 of the likelihood ratio) as independent risk factors 
for nosocomial MRSA acquisition but not for nosocomial MSSA acquisition. 
Bosso and Mauldin 130 used an interrupted time-series study to assess the 
impact of the introduction of levofloxacin and its subsequent replacement 
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with gatifloxacin in a hospital formulary on nosocomial MRSA infection rates. 
Their results appear to show an association with an accelerated increase in 
MRSA infection rates with levofloxacin but a reversal of this trend with 
gatifloxacin. The authors recognize that other factors (such as infection 
control precautions) may have impacted on MRSA infection rates over the 
study period, but the claim that gatifloxacin reversed the trend for increasing 
MRSA infection needs to be interpreted with caution; with the exception of a 
single data point, which could be explained by a cluster of MRSA 
transmission, the MRSA infection rates during the levofloxacin period lay 
within the same range as during the post-levofloxacin (gatifloxacin) period. 
A number of studies have proposed mechanisms for the increased risk of 
MRSA acquisition associated with quinolones, in particular ciprofloxacin. 
Bisognano et al. have identified that exposure of both meticillin-sensitive and 
resistant S. aureus to sub-inhibitory levels of ciprofloxacin promotes the 
expression of fibronectin-binding proteins which are involved in bacterial 
adhesion. 
131 132 Such exposure to sub-inhibitory levels of ciprofloxacin 
in vivo may occur through the excretion of the agent in sweat; exposure of 
this nature has been demonstrated in other staphylococci. 133 
An in vitro study by Venezia et al. 134 demonstrated an increase in high-level 
oxacillin-resistant strains in a heteroresistant population of S. aureus in the 
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presence of quinolones, thus potentially increasing the risk of colonisation by 
these strains. This has yet to be supported by further studies. 
The identification of risk factors for MRSA acquisition is complex and the 
potential for confounding high; the number of putative risk factors identified 
in the literature makes it certain that no study has identified and controlled 
for all the possible risk factors; in particular studies that have not controlled 
for exposure to antibiotics need to be treated with caution as there is a 
strong and consistent association between such exposure and MRSA 
acquisition. 
1.3.6. The clinical and economic impact of MRSA 
Although most patients are colonised rather than infected with MRSA there 
is considerable evidence to support the hypothesis that MRSA cause 
increased morbidity and mortality when compared with MSSA. Two studies 
have identified an increased risk of clinýcal infection related to MRSA nasal 
colonisation; Pujol et al. 72 demonstrated a relative risk (RR) of developing 
bacteraernia of 3.9 comparing MRSA nasal carriers to MSSA nasal carriers 
(p = 0.002; Cox proportional-hazards regression), Davis et al. 
73 showed a 
similar increased risk of MRSA infection whether the MRSA nasal 
colonisation was present on admission (RR 13,95% confidence 
intervals 
[Cl] 2.7 to 6.4) or acquired (RR 12; 95% Cl 4 to 38). 
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The impact of MRSA on mortality has been described by a number of 
studies. Two systematic reviews with meta-analysis comparing mortality in 
MRSA vs. MSSA bacteraemia have been published. Whitby et al. 135 
analysed nine studies, published between 1978 and 2000, of which eight 
found an increased mortality from MRSA bacteraemia. The combined 
relative risk for mortality was 2.12 (95% CI 1.76 to 2.57). 
The meta-analysis published by Cosgrove et aL 136 covered a similar period 
but identified and included 31 studies. Again, there was a significant 
increase in the risk of death from MRSA vs. MSSA bacteraernia (odds 
ratio = 1.93,95% CI 1.54 to 2.42). This latter review noted that there was 
significant heterogeneity between the included studies which was at odds 
with the findings of Whitby and colleagues; this difference may be explained 
by the larger number of studies included in the analysis of Cosgrove et al. 
Chang et al. 137 conducted a prospective study of 505 consecutive patients 
with S. aureus bacteraernia, they found that although MRSA was a risk 
factor for persistent bacteraemia it was not a significant risk factor for 
endocarditis or, when adjusted for other risk factors using logistic regression, 
mortality, although the trend was not significant (p = 0.64; x2 of the likelihood 
ratio), which may suggest an underpowered study for this outcome. 
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Meizer et al. 138 investigated 815 patients with nosocomial S. aureus 
bacteraernia prospectively over five-year period. The adjusted risk of 
mortality from MRSA vs. MSSA bacteraernia was not s1gnificant; however no 
power calculation is presented and the results may be due to an 
inadequately powered study (adjusted OR 1.72,95% Cl 0.92 to 3-2). 
Bader 93 studied seven-day mortality in older patients (age > 60 years). 
Again, after controlling for co-morbidities and disease severity, MRSA was 
not an independent risk factor; it is not possible to assess the impact of 
sample size, which was small (n = 135), as adjusted odds ratios and 
confidence intervals are not given for these findings, which were not 
statistically significant. Shurland et al. 94 conducted a retrospective study of 
438 patients with S. aureus bacteraemia, they found, after adjustment for 
co-morbidities and age, significantly higher mortality in MRSA vs. MSSA 
bacteraernia (hazard ratio 1.8,95% Cl 1.2 to 3). Crowcroft and Catchpole 139 
analysed data from death certificates in England & Wales over a five year 
period; the proportion of certificates that mentioned staphylococcal infection 
and also mentioned MRSA increased from 8% to 44%. The authors admit 
that this analysis is necessarily crude, as it depends on the quality of 
reporting, but they conclude that the data do reflect a genuine increase in 
mortality attributable to MRSA over the period in question. 
Possible explanations for the increased risk of mortality associated with 
MRSA infection include the finding, in many of the quoted studies, that 
Page 32 of 195 
patients with MRSA infection have more severe underlying disease. 
However, in a number of studies and in the analysis by Cosgrove and 
colleagues, who calculated the odds ratio for MRSA vs. MSSA mortality in 
those published studies that controlled for co-morbidity, the risk of death 
remained significant after adjustment (OR 1.88,95% Cl 1.33 to 2.69). This 
suggests that, although co-morbidity may modify the risk of death, it does not 
entirely explain it. 
Schramm et al. 
140 
and Lodise et al. 
141 identify another potential influence on 
mortality related to MRSA: delayed appropriate antimicrobial therapy. Both 
studies demonstrate that MRSA is associated with a delay in initiating 
appropriate antimicrobial therapy and that such delays may be associated 
with increased morbidity and mortality. In addition, vancomycin may be a 
less effective anti-staphylococcal agent than flucloxacillin in susceptible 
strains, making meticillin resistance a driver for increased morbidity and 
mortality but this is not absolutely proven. 
142143 
The economic costs of MRSA infection have been reviewed by Gould 144 in 
2006 who criticises the fact that many studies examining the costs of MRSA 
infection report excess costs vs. MSSA infection, whereas Gould contends 
that MRSA infections are an additional burden rather than simply a 
replacement for IVISSA infection. In this review the range of additional costs 
per case of MRSA infection is quite wide as it includes studies from different 
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countries and different clinical settings over a period of approximately ten 
years. Excess costs (all US$) when compared with MSSA ranged from 
$2,500 to $13,900 and when compared with uninfected controls from $9,275 
to $88,445. National excess hospital costs for the USA are estimated at 
between $1.5 billion and $4.2 billion. 
Studies published after the review by Gould have supported the findings in 
his review. Lodise & McKinnon 145 examined retrospectively 415 cases of 
S. aureus bacteraernia and found that patients with MRSA incurred average 
excess costs (compared with MSSA) of $9,909. Gavalda et al. 146 , again 
retrospectively, looked at all MRSA infections and using only an average 
cost per patient day for either intensive care unit (ICU) or general ward 
stays, estimated the average cost per MRSA infection to be E2,730 (circa 
$3,744, based on $1 = -EO. 7). 
Two studies have examined costs associated with specific patient 
populations; Greiner et al. 147 compared MRSA with MSSA bacteraernia in 
haernodialysis patients. They found that MRSA bacteraernla costs were 
more than double those of MSSA, E24,931 ($34,220) vs. E10,573 ($14,515). 
Four hundred and ninety nine ICU patients with early-onset 
ventilator-associated pneumonia (VAP) were studied retrospectively using a 
USA multi-hospital database by Shorr et al. 148 ; patients whose VAP was 
caused by MRSA had excess costs (vs. MSSA) on average of $7731. 
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The nature of the costs described can be summarised as those that arise 
because of increased length of stay ('hotel costs') and the excess costs of 
diagnosis, management and treatment such as the costs of antibiotics 
effective against MRSA, barrier precautions and additional tests and invasive 
procedures. In addition to these there are the increasing costs of litigation 
and the opportunity costs of cancelled procedures due to ward closure. 
1.3.7. MRSA transmission in healthcare settings 
Epidemic strains of MRSA have demonstrated a remarkable ability to spread 
both within and between healthcare settings. The main reservoir of MRSA 
within healthcare settings is colonised or infected patients and the primary 
route of transmission of MRSA within healthcare settings is considered to be 
via the hands of healthcare workers, with or without contact with the 
inanimate environment or fornites. 
149150 McBryde et al. 
151 found that 17% of 
contacts between a healthcare worker (who had touched the patient, bed or 
bedclothes) and a patient colonised with MRSA resulted in transmission of 
MRSA to the gloves of the healthcare worker. Furthermore, in cases where 
healthcare workers did not don gloves, MRSA was recoverable from their 
hands, after hand washing, in two out of five cases where MRSA was 
isolated pre-hand wash. 
A prospective study of the acquisition of MSSA compared with historical data 
for MRSA by Vriens et al. 152 supported the theory that MRSA spreads more 
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readily than MSSA; the authors suggested that this potential for spread was 
related to either antibiotic selection pressure or to some factor, as yet 
unidentified, intrinsic to MRSA. The contribution of antibiotic selection 
pressure as a significant factor is supported by the studies described in 
section 1.3.5.2 that identified antibiotic use as a significant risk factor for the 
acquisition of MRSA, in particular the work of Weber and colleagues in which 
MSSA acquisition, unlike MRSA, was not related to exposure to 
quinolones. 
129 
Simplistically, at any given time the prevalence of MRSA in a healthcare 
setting will be the sum of those patients who were colonised on admission 
added to those who have acquired MRSA in that setting (transmission), less 
those colonised patients who are 'removed' i. e. decolonised, discharged or 
died 
. 
This dynamic has been studied using mathematical modelling 
techniques that allow for stochastic influences. Three studies have been set 
in intensive care units: Grundmann et al. 110 calculated that, in the absence 
of any infection-control procedures, each index case of MRSA could 
generate as many as ten secondary cases through transmission, but with 
hand hygiene compliance at 59% and cohorting of contacts at 65% (taken 
from observations in their own unit) this figure would be reduced to 1.52. 
Cohorting appears to be defined, in this case, as limiting those staff caring 
for MRSA positive patients to those patients only during a span of duty; 
however the authors fail to define this precisely. A similar study by Forrester 
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& Pettitt 153 modelled rates of transmission of MRSA to susceptible patients 
per day from three potential reservoirs; Patients with MRSA nursed in 
isolation, MRSA patients not in isolation and 'background sources' - defined 
as nosocomial transmission outside of the ICU or from undetected MRSA 
cases within the ICU. Their calculations suggest that background 
transmission occurs more frequently than transmission from known cases, 
whether isolated or not; approximately one transmission every 109,667, and 
192 patient days, respectively. This comparison should be interpreted with 
caution as the denominators for each category are different; per patient day, 
per day - per patient who was not isolated and per day - per isolated 
patient, respectively. In addition the 95% confidence intervals for all these 
data are wide. The modelling of McBrycle et al. '11 supports the theory that, 
in the intensive care unit, MRSA prevalence is maintained through the 
repeated admission of colonised patients and they calculated a transmission 
rate similar to that of Forrester and Pettitt; one transmission per 160 (95% 
Cl; 130 to 210) patient days (for patients not already colonised with MRSA). 
Intensive care units are highly specialised environments with high 
healthcare-worker to patient ratios and it is unlikely that these models would 
fully explain transmission in general ward settings. Raboud et al. 154 
modelled MRSA transmission in a general medical ward and calculated a 
baseline transmission rate approximately tenfold lower than those calculated 
by the ICU models i. e. 0.89 (95% Cl; 0.73 to 1.09) transmissions per 1000 
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patient days or approximately one transmission every 1124 (95% Cl; 917 to 
1370) patient days. 
All models are based on assumptions that may or may not reflect the reality 
in healthcare settings e. g. that a healthcare worker remains contaminated 
with MRSA until (and only until) they next cleanse their hands, 110 111 or that 
patients are homogenous with regard to risk factors for MRSA acquisition. 153 
Nevertheless such modelling may prompt further research to investigate the 
effects of interventions that it suggests will be potentially effective. 
Transmission by the airborne route has been proposed as a contributing 
factor to the spread of MRSA. A number of studies have demonstrated that 
the presence of a viral infection or an allergic rhinitis increases the airborne 
dispersal of S. aureus, 155-157 however these studies looked at MSSA and do 
not necessarily explain the apparent increased propensity for spread 
exhibited by MRSA. Two studies by Shiornori and colleagues 158 159 
examined airborne transmission of MRSA and found that MRSA carrying 
particles could be recovered from air samples in the rooms of both colonised 
and infected patients. The airborne contamination was significantly 
increased during and immediately after bed-making, it is unclear as to 
contribution of these findings to the transmission of MRSA between patients 
as the sampler used was placed only 1 metre from the patients' beds and 
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though plausible, no assessment was made of the likelihood of this 
contamination contributing to cross-infection. 
Kuramoto-Chikamatsu et al. 160 have proposed a novel route for the 
transmission of MRSA; via healthcare workers touching both their own and 
their patients'faces. The authors compared the diversity of MRSA genotypes 
by PFGE in clinical areas and found that the fewest types were present in 
areas that they suggested had the higher frequency of face touching activity. 
While an interesting addition to the debate, this single and 
methodologically-weak study would need significant corroboration before this 
could be considered a likely route of transmission. 
The contribution of environmental and equipment contamination to the 
spread of MRSA is a matter of some debate. 161-163 That MRSA can persist 
in the inanimate environment is clear; a review of the literature by Kramer et 
al. found that MRSA survives for between seven days and seven months on 
inanimate objects. 164 It may not, however, persist in the environment any 
more than sensitive strains of S. aureus, 165 and its ability to persist may be 
strain dependent. 
166 
A systematic review by Griffiths and colleagues 167 identified twenty studies 
published between 1975 and 2000 that were considered rigorous enough to 
establish that MRSA contaminates the inanimate care environment and 
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equipment but only three studies that were able to link the strains in the 
environment to colonised or infected patients. A second review 168 covering 
the period 1996 to 2004 and focussing on the impact of environmental 
cleaning on MRSA control found only four studies that met their inclusion 
criteria. From these studies they concluded that environmental cleaning does 
contribute to MRSA control, from which it can be inferred that environmental 
contamination does contribute to the transmission of the organism in clinical 
practice, presumably via the hands of healthcare workers and patients. 
Studies published more recently reinforce these findings, Oie et al. 169 
investigated environmental contamination with MRSA and MSSA in a 
dermatology ward and found high levels of contamination on surfaces that 
come into contact with multiple patients and noted that certain porous 
materials could not be adequately decontaminated between patients. The 
authors did not attempt to link contamination to cross-infection directly but 
highlighted devices used on multiple patients as possible reservoirs of 
aureus. 
Sexton et al. 
170 
conducted a small, prospective study of MRSA 
contamination in isolation rooms containing patients carrying MRSA. In 35% 
of the rooms, MRSA isolated from environmental sites were indistinguishable 
(using PFGE) from the strains isolated from the patient. This is almost 
identical to the findings of a study in an intensive care unit by Hardy et al. 171 
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This study, over a period of 14 months, found strains from patients and their 
immediate environments that were indistinguishable in 35.7% of occasions. 
These studies emphasise that the contribution of the environment to 
cross-infection remains unclear. The magnitude of that contribution has been 
estimated by an interesting study by Huang et al. 172 who, in a retrospective 
study of nosocornial acquisition of MRSA and VRE, calculated an adjusted 
odds ratio of 1.4 (p = 0.04, using linear regression analysis) for MRSA 
acquisition in patients who were placed in a room in which the previous 
occupant had been colonised by MRSA (described by the authors as 
'MRSA positive') compared with a previous occupant who did not carry 
MRSA. However this risk accounted for only 5.1% of all the nosocomial 
cases of MRSA acquisition during the study, an attributable risk of only 
1.1%. This latter finding reinforces the notion that, though the environment 
may contribute to the transmission of MRSA, direct contact via the hands of 
healthcare workers remains probably the most important factor. 
The contribution of carriage by healthcare workers to the transmission of 
MRSA is controversial and there are few studies that examined this issue 
rigorously. Early work by Cookson et al. 173 identified three distinct patterns 
of MRSA carriage; transient carriage, identified at the end of a span of duty 
but gone on return to duty, short-term carriage; isolation of MRSA only on 
two consecutive screens, and persistent carriage defined as isolation of 
MRSA on more than two consecutive screens. Virtually all of the staff 
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colonisation was explained by close patient contact and, as the staff were 
caring exclusively for known MRSA patients, there was no opportunity to 
identify any staff-patient transmission. 
There are reports of clusters and outbreaks of MRSA that have been 
epidemiologically linked to individual healthcare workers with persistent 
carriage or chronic or recurrent infections, 
174-176 but these are rare and most 
studies describe only the prevalence of MRSA carriage in healthcare 
workers. Reported prevalence rates range from < 1% to 11% of healthcare 
workers screened, but comparisons are difficult to make as the prevalence 
among patients in the hospitals studied varies from rare to endemic. 
177-184 A 
significant criticism of the majority of the published studies in this area is 
their failure to describe clearly the nature of the carriage that they have 
identified i. e. whether such carriage is transient or more persistent. The most 
recent UK guidance on the management of MRSA in hospitals recommends 
that, should staff screening be deemed necessary, great care be taken to 
distinguish between transient and persistent carriage, noting that the former 
carries little risk of onward transmission. The guidance suggests that this is 
best achieved by screening staff before a span of duty. 163 The failure, in the 
published literature, to consider fully this factor is exemplified by the study 
published by Blok et al. 185 in which the prevalence of MRSA among 
healthcare workers over a ten-year period was 11 %, however staff were 
screened at the end of their span of duty and after having cared only for 
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patients colonised or infected by MRSA. Although it is considered to be a 
rare occurrence Muder and colleagues 186 note that, in the endemic setting, 
otherwise-healthy staff can present with clinical infections caused by MRSA 
including skin and eye infections. 
1.3.8. Control of MRSA in hospitals 
In the UK, guidance on the control of MRSA in hospitals has been published 
and revised four times since 1986; the most recent guidance in 2005/6 was 
developed and published under three separate headings, covering; 
laboratory diagnosis, prophylaxis and treatment and, control and 
prevention . 
20 58 163 187-189 Although there has been an increasing emphasis 
on risk assessment and the best use of limited resources, the essential 
strategies recommended for control have remained largely unchanged over 
this period and reflect guidance published in the USA and elsewhere. 190191 
It is recognised that, in general, there is a paucity of evidence from 
well-designed experimental or epidemiological studies to support the 
management of infection control pertaining to MRSA. This point is illustrated 
by the guidance on control and prevention of MRSA published in 2006; 163 
the authors categorise their recommendations using the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) classifications 192 based on the strength of the 
available evidence [see Appendix A]. Of the 57 recommendations (excluding 
those for strains with reduced susceptibility to glycopeptides) only five are 
categorised as IN (Strongly recommended for implementation and strongly 
supported by well-designed experimental, clinical, or epidemiological 
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studies) and a further 25 as '113' (Strongly recommended for implementation 
and strongly supported by certain experimental, clinical or epidemiological 
studies and a strong theoretical rationale). Almost half of the 
recommendations are category '2' i. e. "Suggested for implementation and 
supported by suggestive clinical or epidemiological studies or a theoretical 
rationale". The main strategies recommended by the guidance for the 
management of MRSA in healthcare facilities are; surveillance, antibiotic 
stewardship, screening, topical decolonisation and isolation of cases. 
The efficacy of interventions to improve antibiotic-prescribing practices has 
been systematically reviewed. 193 The authors found that, though some 
studies have demonstrated clear benefits in strategies aimed at amending or 
reducing antibiotic prescribing, there are few studies that have included data 
about the impact on MRSA incidence or prevalence of these strategies. 
Those studies that did address MRSA showed no significant reduction in 
MRSA infection rates related to their interventions. 
1.3.8.1. Screening for MRSA 
Screening of patients and, under certain circumstances, healthcare workers 
is recommended to identify those not previously known to be colonised with 
MRSA and guide further management. 163 Although there is a strong 
theoretical rationale for this approach and screening does undoubtedly 
identify individuals that clinical samples alone would not, 194-196 the evidence 
base for the impact of screening on reducing the prevalence of, and 
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infections by, MRSA is weak. A systematic review by Cooper et al. 197 was 
unable to identify the individual effect of screening as a component of 
programmes to control and reduce MRSA transmission. Loveday et al. 168 
also conducted a systematic review and were unable to find any studies in 
which screening was the primary intervention. Aboelela et al. 198 
systematically reviewed the literature pertaining to screening for all 
multidrug-resistant organisms and concluded that the evidence for the role of 
screening in preventing their transmission is weak. A number of studies have 
been published after the period included in these systematic reviews (i. e. up 
to June 2005). 
In a 19-month prospective cohort study with retrospective controls, 
Wernitz et al. 199 concluded that hospital wide screening of patients with risk 
factors for MRSA vs. no screening reduced the expected rate of 
hospital-acquired MRSA infection (HA-MRSA-1) by 48%; the expected rate 
was, however, based on the assumption that there were more patients at 
high risk of MRSA infection during the screening phase of the study. It is 
unclear from the study description how this assumption was derived. The 
actual rather than the expected reduction in HA-MRSA-I was 10 cases or 
0.03 cases per 1000 patient days [recalculated from the authors' data]. 
Shitrit et al. 
200 
conducted a similar prospective intervention study with a 
retrospective control period but used MRSA bacteraernias as their outcome 
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measure. They found that screening patients deemed to be at high risk of 
MRSA colonisation led to a significant reduction in MRSA bacteraernias of 
1.8 cases per month (OR 0.56; 95% Cl 0.37 to 0.87). The intervention 
followed a period of unexplained increase in MRSA bacteraemias, including 
clusters necessitating ward closure, and their findings may be influenced by 
regression to the mean. In addition there is no comparison of case mix from 
the control and intervention periods or discussion of possible 
'Hawthorne effects' associated with their intervention period. The Hawthorne 
effect has been described as the problem in field experiments that subjects' 
knowledge that they are in an experiment modifies their behaviour from what 
it would have been without such knowledge. 201 
Another similar study was conducted by Clancy et al. 
202 this prospective 
study with a retrospective control period examined the impact of screening 
all ICU patients on both hospital-wide and ICU-specific MRSA infection 
rates. In this study MRSA infections were reduced from 6.1 to 4.1 per 1000 
'census-days' (p = 0.01; paired Student's t test). Infection was defined as the 
receipt of a clinical specimen and this may have overestimated the number 
of infections though not necessarily in a biased manner and again, case mix 
and any potential Hawthorne effect are not discussed. 
Other studies that have included increased screening have identified 
significant reductions in MRSA acquisition and/or infection; however 
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because of the introduction of multiple interventions simultaneously it is not 
possible to identify the specific effect, if any, of screening. 203-205 Despite the 
lack of evidence for its efficacy, there is increasing pressure on hospitals in 
both the USA and the UK to expand screening programmes for MRSA. This 
is largely in response to directives from governments, regulators and other 
authorities. 206 207 
1.3.8.2. The use of topical antimicrobials and antiseptics to treat 
MRSA colonisation. 
Topical agents including mupirocin nasal ointment and skin disinfectants 
such as chlorhexidine gluconate and triclosan have been used widely in 
hospitals to attempt temporary or permanent clecolonisation of MRSA. The 
evidence for the efficacy of these agents in eradicating MRSA from sites of 
colonisation is limited and current UK MRSA control guidelines only 
recommend their use in outbreaks and in patients due to undergo operative 
procedures. 163 A Cochrane systematic review, which considered both 
topical and systemic agents used to eradicate MRSA in carriers, found that 
the quality of the published studies was low and concluded that there was no 
evidence to support the use of these agents in clinical practice. 208 This 
review considered only randomised controlled trials (RCTs) for inclusion and 
it has been argued that this is too conservative a view of the use of research 
evidence ; 209 nevertheless for intervention studies, where efficacy remains 
unproven, RCTs should be the methodology of choice. 
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Evidence published subsequently has been reviewed by Loveday et al. 168 
who considered one RCT and seven other published studies and also 
concluded that the evidence does not support the use of systemic or topical 
antimicrobials for the eradication of MRSA. They noted, however, that the 
selective use of regimens including nasal mupirocin may reduce the risk of 
infection in specific patient groups e. g. those undergoing orthopaedic implant 
surgery. 
210211 
The review by Loveday and colleagues included studies published up to 
June 2004; since then, one RCT and four other trials have been published. 
In an prospective, uncontrolled trial Kampf & Kramer 212 treated patients up 
to three times with nasal mupirocin and an antiseptic soap, they claimed 
eradication rates of up to 94.2%; however, their follow-up period was very 
short (five days post-treatment) and, despite multiple treatment courses, 
there was no attempt to identify resistance to mupirocin. 
Sandri et al. 
213 
studied the impact of treating nasal carriers of MRSA with 
nasal mupirocin and chlorhexidine washes on nosocornial MRSA infections 
in an ICU over a five-year period. They report a year-on-year reduction in 
MRSA infections which was statistically significant by year five (p = 0.001; 
x 2). It is unclear whether this reduction can be directly attributed to the use of 
topical decolonisation as there is no assessment of case-mix or other 
infection risks in the study population. In addition there is no information 
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about infection or colonisation rates prior to the intervention so regression to 
the mean cannot be excluded as a possible explanation for these findings. 
Muller et al. 
214 
conducted a retrospective analysis of using, followed by 
stopping the use of, nasal mupirocin, in consecutive two-year periods in an 
ICU. They concluded that in the absence of mupirocin, there was a 
significant increase in endogenously-acq ui red MRSA (p = 0.02; Mann- 
Whitney test); however their definition of 'endogenously-acquired' is based 
only on the patient acquiring an infection after having previous nasal 
colonisation without organism typing. Direct cross-infection leading to 
exogenous infection could have occurred in some of these cases. As well as 
suffering from methodological weaknesses, these latter two studies may not 
be capable of extrapolation beyond the ICU setting. 
In a long term, prospective study of a ward with a high proportion of patients 
at high risk for MRSA colonisation and infection due to repeated 
hospitalisation and chronic disease, Dupeyron et al. 
215 
measured MRSA 
nasal carriage and clinical infection during 55 months of nasal mupirocin 
use. They concluded that a significant reduction in both acquired nasal 
colonisation and clinical infection (p = 0.006 and 0.022; respectively, 
Student's t test) was attributable to the use of nasal mupirocin; this is a 
plausible explanation and the authors identified no other changes in patient 
population or practice during the study period. It is possible that the quality of 
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infection-control procedures improved over the same period and contributed 
to the outcome, though improvements in practices such as hand hygiene are 
notoriously difficult to sustain. 
216 
Simor et al. 217, in a randomised controlled trial, compared a decolonisation 
regimen that included nasal mupirocin and chlorhexidine washing with oral 
rifampicin and doxycycline, with no treatment; 74% of the patients who 
received the intervention had negative cultures for MRSA at three-month 
follow-up, compared with 32% of the controls (p = 0.00ol; X). It is 
interesting to note that, despite being significantly more effective than no 
treatment, this very aggressive regimen still failed in 26% of patients. 
Regimens that include systemic antibiotics are unlikely to be adopted for 
widespread use in situations where MRSA is endemic because of the fear of 
increasing antibiotic resistance; however they may be of value in specific 
high-risk patient population s. 
218 
1.4. Isolation precautions to prevent the transmission of 
potentially infectious microorganisms 
Isolation of hospital patients, usually in single rooms, which may or may not 
have anterooms or controlled airflow, is intended to interrupt the 
transmission of infectious microorganisms from patient to patient (or staff). 
The practice of isolation incorporates both the placement of the patient and a 
group of precautions that are used in addition to standard precautions and 
are designed to prevent transmission; these are referred to collectively as 
lcontact' or 'barrier' precautions. Contact precautions encompass: hand 
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hygiene and the use of protective clothing as well as equipment 
decontamination and environmental hygiene. Isolation practices have 
evolved over the last century becoming more focussed on the known routes 
of transmission of infection, i. e. airborne, droplet and contact, and less based 
on rituals such as the use of disposable crockery and cutlery or the double 
bagging of waste from isolation rooms; additionally in the UK there has been 
a move away from dedicated isolation facilities (i. e. isolation wards) towards 
isolation in single rooms on general wards. 192219 
Airborne spread can be defined as the spread of infections that are 
disseminated by airborne droplet nuclei or small particles in the respirable 
range, defined as < 5pm in size and capable of being inhaled deep into the 
respiratory tract. These particles contain the infectious agent, which is 
capable of remaining infective over time and distance. Thus the susceptible 
individual need not be in close contact with the source patient. Examples 
include Mycobacterium tuberculosis and varicella-zoster virus . 
220 The need 
for isolation in a single room, with, ideally, controlled ventilation to prevent 
the spread of these organisms is uncontroversial. 
For infections that are spread by the droplet or contact route and for the 
latter only those organisms that are considered to be epidemiologically 
important e. g. bacteria resistant to multiple antibiotics and Clostridium 
difficile, placing the patient in a single room is considered to be an 
important 
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component of the necessary precautions to prevent transmission. 163 190 192 
219-222 This is despite the fact that these organisms are spread primarily 
either by close face-to-face contact in the case of those organisms spread by 
the droplet route such as the influenza virus and Neisseria meningifidis or by 
direct and indirect contact. 
1.4.1. Current guidance on isolation 
There are currently no formal guidelines for patient isolation in England and 
Wales, i. e. endorsed by the Department of Health,. This contrasts with the 
USA where the CDC, a federal agency concerned with infection prevention 
and control, among other issues, has issued guidance on this subject. 192220 
The CDC guidance covers all aspects of isolation practice including: 
suitability of facilities; the nature of the required barrier precautions, and the 
USA regulatory framework, as well as listing the majority of organisms, 
diseases and scenarios for which isolation may be required with guidance as 
to the level of precautions to employ. The CDC guidance is based on the 
concept of 'transmission-based precautions' thus different levels of isolation 
are deemed appropriate depending on how the organism is transmitted e. g. 
airborne or contact transmission. 
Although there is no UK equivalent of the above guidance a joint working 
group of the Association of Medical Microbiologists, British Infection Society, 
Hospital Infection Society, Infection Control Nurses Association and the 
Public Health Laboratory Service [now part of the Health Protection Agency] 
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have produced a review of hospital isolation and infection control related 
precautions . 
21 9 This review supports in most respects the CDC 
recommendations, including the principle of transmission-based precautions 
but, unlike that guidance, does not attempt to provide an exhaustive list of 
organisms and the required level of precautions. Such guidance on isolation 
for specific organisms or conditions may be found in UK health department 
documents on, for example, tubercu IoSiS' 223 viral haemorrhagic fever 224 and 
Clostridium difficile. 225 
1.4.2. Availability of single rooms and prioritisation of usage 
When comparing USA and UK isolation practice it is important to be aware 
of the structural differences in their respective health-care facilities. Typically 
US hospitals are designed and built with rooms to accommodate one 
('private') or two ('semi-private') patients. 226 Thus CDC guidelines are based 
on an almost certain availability of single (or at least usable-as single) 
rooms. UK hospitals in contrast are normally built with a variable number of 
single rooms per ward, a number that has historically been quite low. For 
example, and excluding a small number of specialist wards with all single 
rooms, the General Infirmary at Leeds has between none and six single 
rooms per (approximately) 25-30 bedded ward. Current guidance for the 
proportion of beds as single rooms in UK hospitals is limited to planning 
guidance applicable to new buildings and major refurbishments only, which 
takes as its starting point an assumption that a minimum of 50% of the beds 
will be single rooms ; 
227 228 however, in reality very few NHS hospitals are 
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even close to this standard. NHS Estates in England (now defunct) in 2005 
stated that "the NHS rarely provides more than 20% single rooms in its 
hospitals". 229 
The decision to base UK guidance for hospital design on a minimum 50% of 
single rooms is based on a number of factors in addition to the assumption 
that it will be valuable in the prevention of HCAL In particular, single rooms 
provide privacy, dignity and confidentiality for patients and most, though not 
all, patients would choose a single room if available. In addition, single 
rooms are regarded as quieter and more conducive to being personalised in 
terms of levels of lighting, temperature and visiting times. 
From the perspective of the healthcare organisation, single rooms provide 
greater flexibility in use, e. g. can be occupied by either gender and by all 
ages. Set against these potential advantages are issues of increased 
building costs and the possibility that NHS healthcare workers will have 
difficulty adjusting existing ways of working to suit a higher level of provision 
of single rooms. 
230231 
The disparity between the guidance on isolation of patients with 
epidemiologically-important organisms and the reality of single room 
provision makes all such guidance a 'counsel of perfection , 
219 and 
necessitates that hospital personnel make choices regarding the 
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prioritisation of single rooms. These choices not only encompass 
infection-control requirements but necessarily also include other conflicting 
demands on the availability of single rooms, such as care of the terminally ill, 
patients who are disturbed and disruptive and patient choice. 
There are few published reports of the requirements for, or the utilisation of 
single rooms for isolation of patients with epidemiologically-important 
organisms and/or infectious diseases. Two studies from Dundee, Scotland, 
have prospectively studied the usage of isolation rooms in a dedicated 
infectious diseases un it. 
232 233 In both studies they observed that this very 
limited and highly specialised resource was used inappropriately, with 
approximately half the patients (44.1% and 55.1%, respectively, in the two 
studies) admitted to the isolation rooms presenting no risk of infection 
transmission. 
Two studies have undertaken repeated point-prevalence surveys of the use 
of single rooms on general wards, suitable for patient isolation. Barlow et 
al. 234 found that in three surveys an average of only 39.5% of such rooms 
(n = 129) were occupied by patients with a recognised risk of transmitting 
infection but that there were 28 of 79 (35%) patients, who were deemed to 
carry a risk of transmission, in open bays. Of these 28, seven were in an 
MRSA cohort leaving 21 in bays with patients not known to be colonised with 
epidemiologically important organisms such as MRSA and eleven of these 
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were considered to have at least one risk factor for increased transmission 
risk. The study by Doherty et al. 235 was limited to MRSA patients only but 
again found, on average, a large proportion (32%) not isolated or cohorted 
despite only 61 % of suitable single rooms being in use for isolation. 
The UK joint working party report suggests, as one possible way forward, the 
adoption of a formal risk-assessment tool for the assessment of need for 
isolation; the example they give is the 'Lewisham Isolation Priority System' 
(LI pS) 236. 'LIPS' is a scoring system giving scores for a number of criteria 
including: route of transmission; significant resistance and the susceptibility 
of other patients and calculates from these scores a result that indicates the 
priority for isolation (Appendix B). Other similar risk-assessment tools have 
been developed and published. 
237-239 
Although the authors of these tools have made anecdotal claims for their 
utility and effectiveness there is no evidence of them having been formally 
evaluated. Such a tested and evaluated tool would be potentially useful but it 
is unclear how such testing would take place as there is no 'gold standard' 
against which to measure the accuracy and the effectiveness of the tools. An 
initial approach might be to test the inter-observer reliability of the tools to 
identify if they are at least applied consistently. 
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1.4.3. Compliance with isolation precautions 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that compliance with isolation precautions, in 
particular contact precautions, is sub-optimal. Afif et al. 240 observed 
compliance with isolation precautions for MRSA including the appropriate 
use of protective clothing and hand hygiene. Overall compliance from 488 
observations was 28%. In a multivariate analysis the only significant 
predictor of poor compliance was the profession of the healthcare worker 
with occupational therapists and physiotherapists most compliant and 
housekeeping staff least. 
A study by Cromer et al. 
241 
used an intensive feedback and education 
programme to achieve and sustain improved compliance with contact 
precautions to prevent transmission of antibiotic-resistant organisms. From a 
starting point of only 19% compliance their programme achieved a sustained 
mean daily compliance of 72%. They claim that this reduced the MRSA 
acquisition rate in their facility despite increased colonisation pressure-, 
however they present no statistical analysis to justify the significance of this 
reduction. 
Another intervention study, set in an ICU, utilised a targeted information flyer 
to increase compliance with isolations for MRSA; although this study 
reported a statistically significant increase in all the outcome measures for 
compliance (p < 0.05 for all; Fisher's exact test with Holm's correction for 
multiple testing), these were 'proxy' measures such as the availability of 
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appropriate equipment and the placing of signs on isolation room doors. It is 
unclear whether this demonstrates any measurement of actual 
compliance. 
242 
Manian et al. 
243 
observed gown-wearing as part of contact precautions on 
both ICUs and general wards. From 1,552 observations they identified 
overall compliance of 73% (76% for healthcare workers). Weber et al. 244 
observed compliance with all types of isolation protocols in three 
hospital-wide observational surveys. They found that compliance was mostly 
sub-optimal with compliance with contact precautions of 73%. 
Another study that used 'proxy measures' for isolation compliance was 
unique in that it examined compliance with isolation precautions used as a 
matter of routine until the results of MRSA surveillance cultures were 
available (described as 'preventive barrier precautions'). 245 The authors 
found, even using these crude measures, compliance to be very low (range 
3 to 62% for the various elements examined) and it is likely that actual 
compliance would be even lower. 
1.4.4. Potential detrimental effects of isolation 
A number of studies have been published that describe the potential adverse 
effects associated with placing patients in isolation. These include 
psychological morbidities such as extreme boredom, a risk of lowered or 
disturbed mood, a perception of stigmatisation; and depression. These 
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psychological morbidities have been identified previously in some isolated 
patients, although other authors have found little evidence of such 
detrimental effects. 246-250 
Other studies have identified other risks to patients in source isolation 
related to the risk of adverse events and reduced quality of care; Kirkland 
and Weinstein 251 observed that healthcare workers were only half as likely 
to enter the room of an ICU patient in isolation. This finding was reinforced 
by Evans et al. 252 who observed that isolated patients received fewer visits 
and were attended for less time by healthcare workers than patients who 
were not isolated, and partly reinforced by Saint et al. 253 who observed that 
attending physicians [consultants] were significantly less likely to visit 
medical patients in isolation (RR 0.49,95% Cl 0.3 to 0.79) but senior 
residents [specialist registrars] were not. Stelfox et al. 254 compared patients 
isolated because of MRSA with controls who were not isolated from both a 
general and disease-specific (congestive heart failure) population in a 
case-control study. They found that isolated patients were twice as likely to 
experience adverse events as patients who were not isolated (p < 0.001; 
Student's t test), were more likely to complain about the quality of their care 
(p < 0.001; Student's t test), and to have neither vital signs nor medical 
progress documented appropriately (p < 0.001 for both; Student's t test). In 
addition, there have been two case reports of isolation for MRSA being 
255256 detrimental to proper and necessary rehabilitation . 
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1.4.5. Isolation to control the transmission of multi-drug resistant 
organisms. 
The evidence for the effectiveness of contact precautions, including 
placement in a single room, in preventing and controlling the transmission of 
multi-drug-resistant organisms (MDROs) has been systematically 
reviewed. 198 The authors of the review considered the literature published 
until June 2005 and, after excluding outbreak reports, identified 29 studies 
suitable for inclusion of which seven were deemed to be of high quality using 
a recognised assessment tool. They concluded that the findings of the 
studies were generally consistent and supported the use of contact 
precautions in reducing the transmission of MDROs but that they were 
methodologically weak and potentially subject to significant biases, including 
performance, selection, detection, attrition and investigator biases. In 
particular, virtually all of the published studies examined multiple 
interventions simultaneously thus making it impossible to measure the 
impact of individual components of a control programme. In addition, almost 
none of the studies measured the compliance with the intervention being 
tested. The authors recognise that their review is limited as they only 
reviewed English-language papers but they fail also to discuss or test for any 
potential publication bias and their search strategy makes no mention of 
9 grey' literature. 
These findings are supported by recently-published guidance from the USA 
on the management of MDROs in healthcare settings. 222 The guidance 
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authors identified 104 published reports of interventions to control the 
transmission of MRSA, vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) or 
multidrug-resistant Gram-negative bacilli. The median number of 
interventions per study was seven, though the authors comment that this 
may be an underestimate due to under reporting of initial interventions. 
Although there is an impressive consistency in the outcomes reported in 
their review, the authors do not describe any search strategy or assessment 
of methodological quality as part of their review process. It is likely that 
many, if not the overwhelming majority, of the studies they quote, given that 
they note that > 60% or them are reports of outbreaks, will suffer from the 
methodological weaknesses and systematic biases reported by Aboelela 
and colleagues. 198 The authors note that there are currently no studies that 
have directly compared standard precautions with standard plus contact 
precautions to control the transmission of MDROs but that a large 
multi-centre randomised trial is in progress comparing 'standard care' 
(standard precautions and collection but not reporting of screening cultures) 
with an enhanced strategy involving collecting and reporting screening 
cultures, routine glove use unless patients have had negative results from 
screening samples for MRSA and VRE and contact precautions for all 
identified cases of infection with MRSA and VRE. From the limited protocol 
information available for this trial, available on-line at: 
http: //clinicaltrials. gov/ct/show/NCT00100386? order=l, it is not clear whether 
contact precautions will automatically include a single room or how 
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clinically-ascertained cases of MRSA and VRE infection will be managed 
under 'standard care'. In addition this trial is set in intensive care units and 
the results may not generalise to other populations, 
1.4.5.1. Isolation to control the transmission of MRSA 
Isolation in a single room or cohorting of affected patients is recommended 
for the control of MRSA in hospitals in the UK and other countries. 
163 190 191 
These recommendations are based on the potential for dispersal of 
staphylococci via airborne particles as well as through direct contact and on 
historical studies demonstrating control of staphylococcal transmission using 
isolation in a single room. 
257-259 UK guidance also draws on the experience 
of other countries, in particular those of northern Europe, where aggressive 
control programmes appear to have been successful in preventing MRSA 
becoming endemic; 
68194 260 261 however, UK experience has matched that of 
many countries in that, despite initially adopting an aggressive control policy, 
MRSA has become endemic in most hospitals. This situation has occurred 
even where, initially, limited success in controlling MRSA has been 
demonstrated. 262 
Cooper et al. systematically reviewed the literature on isolation measures in 
the hospital management of MRSA; 197 their review identified 46 studies 
published up until the year 2000 that investigated the impact of isolation in a 
single room, isolation wards or nurse cohorting on the incidence of MRSA 
colonisation and/or infection. The authors were unable to conduct 
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meta-analysis of the available studies due to their heterogeneity and 
therefore presented their findings as a narrative summary of the quality and 
outcomes of each study. They concluded that the majority of the studies 
were methodologically weak due to poor design, major confounders and/or 
the risk of systematic biases and that virtually all combined isolation with at 
least one other simultaneous intervention, making it impossible to assess the 
relative contribution of isolation. They did note that six of the studies 
provided some evidence, consistent with a reduction in MRSA that was 
related to isolation, and with a relative lack of plausible alternative 
explanations. Of these six studies, only two provided any evidence that 
isolation in single rooms had a significant impact and of these two, one 
included multiple interventions including an 'extensive' hand hygiene 
programme and the other was set in a paediatric ICU, thus making it difficult 
to generalise the results. From this comprehensive review of the evidence, 
Cooper and colleagues concluded that there was little evidence to prove that 
current strategies for managing MRSA, including isolation, are ineffective, 
but that the evidence to demonstrate that such strategies are effective is 
limited. 
These conclusions are supported by a second systematic review of the 
efficacy of patient isolation for the control of MRSA in hospitals, 
263 this 
review also included studies published until 2000 but, unlike the former 
review, was limited to studies published after 1980. The authors of this 
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review concurred with Cooper and colleagues, describing the quality of the 
available evidence as having "significant methodological weaknesses"; and 
concluded that there was a lack of proven clinical benefit for isolation, though 
they also cautioned against discontinuing current practice without further 
research. 
A third systematic review, published in 2006, noted the findings of the 
reviews described above and identified studies published after the period 
already covered and up until June 2004.168 This review identified four further 
observational studies that were considered to be of an acceptable quality, all 
of which supported the view that isolation contributed to reductions in MRSA 
prevalence; however one was set in a dedicated cohort ward rather than 
using single rooms for isolation 264 and two reported multiple intervention S 265 
266 making it impossible to identify the relative contribution of isolation 
precautions alone. The fourth stud y 267 compared the results of a 
questionnaire about infection-control processes in German intensive care 
units with infection rates reported to that country's national surveillance 
system; multivariate analysis of the results demonstrated lower rates of 
MRSA infection associated with the routine isolation of MRSA patients (OR 
0.36,95% Cl 0.17 to 0.79); again, however, these results may not be easily 
extrapolated to populations who are not nursed on ICU facilities, where 
patient risk factors and staff-patient ratios are very different. There have 
been further studies published since the time covered by these three 
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systematic reviews; using the criteria for study selection employed by 
Cooper et al. 197 (see Appendix C) eleven articles were identified: Pastila et 
al. 268 describe the control of a multi-hospital, ten-year outbreak of epidemic 
MRSA using a combination of screening and isolation/cohorting as well as 
an education programme. They successfully controlled the outbreak, 
returning MRSA incidence to a low annual baseline of under five cases per 
year. The data were analysed retrospectively and there are no data points 
given either before or after the epidemic period thus making if difficult to 
exclude the contribution of regression to the mean effects to the outcome 
presented. Tomic et al. 269 prospectively measured both MRSA incidence 
and the proportion of MRSA cases deemed to be acquired in their institution, 
both before and after the institution of multiple interventions designed to 
detect cases and to prevent nosocomial transmission. They found no 
significant change in MRSA incidence over five years but did identity a 
significant increase in the proportion of all MRSA cases that were deemed 
2 as imported (p < 0.001; , 
test for trend). It is plausible that their X 
interventions prevented a significant overall rise in MRSA incidence but the 
relative impact of isolation cannot be identified due to the number of 
270 1 
simultaneous interventions. A study by Cepeda and colleagues, In two 
intensive care units, prospectively studied the impact of isolation in a single 
room as a single intervention, on MRSA acquisition rates and found that 
there was no change, either before or after adjustment for a number of 
potential confounders, in MRSA acquisition whether patients harbouring 
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MRSA were moved to single rooms or not. This prospective study of a single 
intervention provides strong support for the theory that isolation in a single 
room does not, in the ICU setting, reduce MRSA transmission. Observed 
hand hygiene compliance was very low (21% of hand hygiene opportunities 
taken) and this may partly explain these findings; nevertheless this only 
reflects 'real-life' clinical practice. 
Schelenz et al. 
203 in a retrospective analysis, reported a significant decrease 
in nosocomial MRSA acquisition and MRSA bloodstream infections 
X2) (p = 0.003 and 0.014, respectively; , 
in a cardiothoracic ward, following 
interventions targeted at MRSA infection. However they implemented twelve 
different interventions simultaneously, making assessment of the relative 
contribution of isolation impossible. 
A report by Khoury and colleagues 27 1 describes the successful and 
prolonged elimination of MRSA from a neonatal intensive care unit following 
an outbreak. The fact that no cases occurred in the two and a half years 
following the intervention suggests that the intervention was effective, 
notwithstanding any regression to the mean effect; however the setting is 
highly specific and thus the findings are not easily generalised and again, 
multiple interventions were introduced at the same time. 
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Huang et al. 
272 
retrospectively analysed the sequential implementation of 
four different infection control interventions in intensive care units, unusually 
these were implemented one at a time. Of the four interventions; maximal 
sterile barrier precautions for central venous catheter insertion, introduction 
of alcohol-based hand rub, a hand hygiene campaign and routine 
surveillance swabs for MRSA with contact precautions for all identified 
cases, only the latter had an impact on rising incidence of MRSA. 
Interestingly, this impact was found both within the ICUs themselves and in 
the wider hospital population. As the apparently effective intervention was 
the last to be applied it could be argued that the impact was a cumulative 
one, but the effect was sustained for more than one year. 
A report by Safdar et al. 
273 describes an MRSA outbreak in a burns unit and 
ascribes termination of the outbreak to the use of pre-emptive (i. e. for every 
patient, regardless of MRSA status) barrier precautions; however the authors 
present the MRSA incidence data in three phases; pre-, during and 
post-intervention and the MRSA incidence rates pre and post intervention 
are not significantly different (the 95% Cl overlap) strongly suggesting 
regression to the mean as a plausible alternative explanation for their 
findings. 
Shitrit et al. 
200 investigated the impact of introducing surveillance for MRSA 
carriage in high-risk patients (those deemed most likely to be carriers) and 
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contact precautions for all those found to be positive on hospital-wide MRSA 
bacteraemia incidence over a two and half year period (13 months before 
and 14 months after). They found a significant reduction in bacteraemia 
cases (p < 0.001; Student's t test); however they note that during the 
pre-intervention period MRSA bacteraernia cases had increased, including 
several 'outbreaks'. The authors do not provide data for the pre-increase 
baseline period, it is therefore impossible to exclude regression to the mean 
effects. In addition it is unfortunate that data for nosocomial MRSA 
acquisition are not given as this may better reflect the impact of 
isolation/contact precautions, which are designed to prevent transmission 
rather than bacteraernia. Of course bacteraernia may be an appropriate 
marker for the overall burden of MRSA, but this is unproven. 
The systematic review by Cooper et al. 197 made recommendations as to the 
conduct and reporting of 'interrupted time series' intervention studies. The 
report by Curran et al. 
274 folloWS these conventions in reporting the use of a 
temporary cohort ward to reduce the incidence of MRSA in vascular surgery. 
They report a sustained reduction in MRSA incidence through the cohorting 
of patients and nurses; interestingly this reduction has been sustained 
despite the closure of the temporary facility, which the authors ascribe to the 
ability to identify and isolate all cases in the available single rooms following 
the reduction in MRSA prevalence. The authors note that they used 
additional interventions simultaneously such as enhanced cleaning and 
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support for early discharge and that these could have contributed to the 
outcome being measured. In addition, the fact that the reduced incidence 
has been sustained despite the closure of the cohort may suggest that 
factors other than the cohort per se may have had an impact. Nevertheless 
this is a well-conducted and reported study that supports the use of 
separation of patients harbouring MRSA from those who do not carry this 
bacterium. 
Harbath et al. 275 describe the use of rapid screening, utilising multiplex 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing and pre-emptive isolation for those 
deemed to be at high risk of MRSA colonisation on admission to ICUs at a 
large tertiary referral centre. Their results are not consistent, as they found a 
reduction in nosocomial MRSA acquisition in the medical but not the surgical 
ICU at their facility (RR 0.3,95% CI 0.1 to 0.7 and RR 1,95% Cl 0.6 to 1.7, 
respectively). The authors suggest this may be due to differences in the two 
populations. If the effect is due to the intervention, and if the observation is 
true, this suggests that the effect is highly specific and cannot be 
extrapolated beyond the population studied. 
An observational study by Bracco et al. 
276 
reported the incidence of 
acquired MRSA (and other nosocomial pathogens), comparing occupants of 
open bays with those of single rooms. Using multivariate analysis they found 
that occupants of single rooms were significantly less likely to acquire MRSA 
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(OR 0.65,95% CI 0.42 to 0.98). There were, however, significant differences 
between those patients in single rooms and those in bays, including receipt 
of antibiotics, and there is inadequate description of the multivariate analysis 
in the report to determine if these differences were controlled for in the 
analysis. Gould et al. 204 conducted a prospective interventional study with 
historical control data in an ICU, into the impact on MRSA incidence of 
introducing screening for MRSA with isolation and continuous topical 
decolonisation treatment of identified carriers throughout their ICU stay. 
While their results show a convincing and sustained reduction in MRSA 
incidence (using time-series regression analysis p=0.005), it is not possible 
to identify the specific effect, if any, of the isolation/contact precautions vs. 
the extensive use of topical decolonisation treatments. 
In summary, these eleven more recently published studies, while in some 
cases demonstrating improvements in design, analysis and reporting of 
longitudinal and 'before and after' interrupted time series intervention 
studies, demonstrate that, though highly plausible the case for isolation or 
cohorting of patients to reduce the incidence of MRSA is not proven. Many of 
the studies fail to consider potential biases or other plausible explanations 
for the effects found or report multiple simultaneous interventions thus 
making it imPOssible to identify the relative effect of an individual intervention 
such as isolation. Others, for reasons of clinical priority and logistics, are set 
in untypical populations e. g. adult or neonatal ICU patients and even when 
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their results support the use of isolation such results cannot be necessarily 
generalised to the wider hospital population. 
In addition to reviewing the literature systematically, Cooper and colleagues 
used both stochastic and deterministic mathematical models to study the 
effects of opening an isolation ward on MRSA transmission and prevalence 
in the epidemic and endemic settings. 197 As previously discussed, all 
modelling is limited by the necessary assumptions that are made; in this 
case the authors assumed both that the population would be homogenous 
with regards to risk of MRSA acquisition, and that no transmission occurred 
outside of the hospital. Both of these assumptions are likely to be flawed, the 
first especially so. From their modelling the authors concluded that such an 
intervention could, over time, reduce MRSA transmission and prevalence but 
that this may be dependent on several factors, in particular; the timing of the 
intervention (the earlier in the epidemic the more likely to succeed), the level 
of the resource provision i. e. the size and potential for scaling-up of the 
isolation ward, and some element of chance or stochastic variation. 
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2. Aims of the current study 
2.1 Introduction 
The recommendation to isolate patients with communicable diseases or 
organisms of epidemiological importance has been described as a counsel 
of perfection. There is a general perception that although isolation may be 
recommended, in many cases it is not achieved due to a lack of facilities and 
conflicting priorities for the use of those facilities. Currently, in the UK, there 
is no-evidence based guidance on the required number of single rooms per 
ward for the purpose of isolation or other patient management needs (e. g. 
terminal care). 
There is a lack of published data on the extent of the problem of failing to 
isolate patients appropriately, on the reasons for such failures or on the 
impact of these failures on the control of communicable diseases and 
epidemiologically important organisms. In particular there are few studies 
that directly examine the relationship between 'failure to isolate' and the 
prevalence of MRSA. 
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2.2 Aims 
2.2.1 Prospective evaluation of the incidence of isolation failure 
e To identify why ward staff are unable or unwilling to isolate 
patients, following risk assessment and advice from an infection 
control nurse. 
* To identify further the duration of such "failures to isolate" and 
the ongoing placement of the affected patients until such time as 
isolation is deemed no longer necessary or the patient is 
discharged from hospital or dies. 
* To determine the extent of isolation facilities and how closely 
this provision meets current infection control needs, particularly 
in respect of MRSA. 
* To establish if there is any correlation between rates of 'failure 
to isolate' and the incidence, by ward, of MRSA from samples 
submifted for clinical purposes. 
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2.2.2 Prospective observational cohort study of MRSA acquisition 
comparing index cases who were isolated with those who were 
not isolated 
* To determine the adjusted relative risk of secondary cases of 
MRSA following successful and unsuccessful attempts to 
isolate patients with MRSA. 
9 To identify independent risk factors for MRSA acquisition 
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Materials and Methods 
3.1. Ethics 
The studies were approved by the Leeds Research Ethics Committee and 
registered for research governance purposes with the research and 
development department of the Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust. 
3.2. Study setting 
The study was undertaken in the Leeds General Infirmary (LGI), which is 
one of two large hospitals that form part of the Leeds Teaching Hospitals 
NHS Trust. The hospital has approximately 1150 beds distributed across 
60 wards, and is typical of a large UK NHS teaching hospital, with a wide 
range of medical and surgical specialities (for both adults and children) and a 
number of regional specialities, including neonatal services, cardiothoracic 
surgery and neurosciences. The hospital has 45 ITU beds and a renal unit, 
but does not have an on-site isolation/infectious diseases unit. There is a 
wide range of building types built between the 1 9th and late 2 Oth centuries. 
MRSA prevalence at the LGI, as measured by the number of MRSA 
bacteraemia cases per 1000 patient days, is similar to other large teaching 
hospitals and comparable with or higher than other UK hospitals in 
general 277, thus MRSA may be described as endemic within the LGI. 
During the study there were no changes to the policies and protocols in 
place for the isolation of patients with potentially transmissible infections or 
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for the management of MRSA. In addition there were no major alterations to 
the Trust antimicrobial policy. 
3.2.1 Policies for the infection control management of MRSA and 
for isolation of patients colonised or infected with 
epidemiologically-important microorganisms or with 
communicable diseases. 
Screening for MRSA was limited to patients admitted from countries outside 
of the UK and only after discussion on a case-by-case basis with a 
microbiologist. Topical decolonisation agents including mupirocin nasal 
cream and triclosan body washes were only used in certain high-risk 
specialities e. g. critical care units and what were deemed to be high-risk 
surgical specialities; in addition, patients undergoing major operations in 
certain specialities received a prophylaxis regimen to prevent infection with 
S. aureus comprising nasal mupirocin and triclosan washes, without 
pre-operative screening for MRSA. 210 In any situation where they were 
used, topical decolonisation agents were only used for a single course per 
patient. 
Isolation in single rooms or grouping together in bays, known as 'cohorting', 
of patients identified to be colonised or infected with MRSA was done on the 
basis of a risk assessment. The risk assessment took into account both the 
potential for dissemination of MRSA from the identified patient and the 
vulnerability of the other patients on the ward or department to the 
consequences of MRSA colonisation and the potential of subsequent 
infection. 
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The potential for dissemination of MRSA from the identified patient was 
considered to be greater if MRSA was identified from sputum or from an 
leaking wound or one that required frequent changes of dressing and also if 
the MRSA was considered to be causing active infection rather than 
colonisation. Increased dissemination was also considered likely if the 
patient had an exfoliating skin disorder such as eczema or psoriasis. Groups 
of patients considered to be more vulnerable to the consequences of MRSA 
colonisation or infection included those at increased risk of infection in 
general, e. g. the critically ill or immune-suppressed as well as those 
undergoing most types of surgery. For the full policy for the infection control 
management of MRSA in place during the study period refer to appendix E 
For all situations in which a patient was known or suspected to be colonised 
or infected with an epidemiologically-important microorganism or to have a 
communicable diseases, the decision to isolate or not to isolate a patient in a 
single room or to place the patient in a cohort with other patients affected by 
the same organism or condition was made after a risk assessment made 
collaboratively between the clinical staff caring for the patient and the 
infection control team. The risk assessment was not detailed in any written 
policy, as the 'source isolation policy' (appendix F) was primarily intended to 
describe the necessary precautions once the decision to isolate or place in a 
cohort had been made. Such risk assessments gave priority to infections 
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transmitted via the airborne or droplet route (see 1.4) and when considering 
those infections spread primarily by contact, priority for isolation took into 
account the factors described in the Lewisham Isolation Priority System 
(appendix B) e. g. any significant resistance to antimicrobials, the 
susceptibility of other patients nearby, the prevalence of the organism and 
the potential for its dispersal. The Lewisham system was not, however, 
adopted formally within the organisation. 
3.3 Prospective evaluation of patient isolation requirements 
and isolation room capacity. 
3.3.1. Study design 
The study was a prospective, observational study without any intervention. 
3.3.2. Data collection 
Data were collected on every requirement for patient isolation for 
infection-control reasons during the period April 2003 to March 2004. 
Following risk assessment in collaboration with clinical staff caring for the 
patient, each requirement for isolation was made by an infection-control 
nurse (or doctor). The outcome of the risk assessment and, in cases where 
this indicated the need for isolation, whether this was achieved, was 
recorded ('isolation not required', 'required and achieved, or 'required but 
not achieved'), with details of the factors influencing the assessment, on a 
database (Alert, ISoft p1c, Manchester, UK). 
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Successful isolation included both isolation in a single room and the 
placement of the patient in a cohort of patients with the same pathogen or 
disease. When the outcome was 'isolation required but not achieved' 
(henceforth referred to as 'failure to isolate') a single investigator followed up 
the case and ascertained the following: the reason(s), as expressed by the 
ward nursing staff, why the requirement for isolation was not possible; the 
location of the patient; and the duration of the 'failure to isolate' (to the 
nearest whole day). 
To calculate the total number of patient days of exposure, to cases of 'failure 
to isolate', 100% bed occupancy was assumed. The total number of patient 
days of exposure to cases of 'failure to isolate' is calculated as: 
(number of beds in bay -1) x (duration of 'failure to isolate' in days). 
Using 100% bed occupancy is necessarily crude as the true bed occupancy 
per day on each ward and each multi-bedded room was unknown. To allow 
for this, the outcome was recalculated using low and high estimates of bed 
occupancy, based on local knowledge and experience, of 85 and 95%. 
Four point-prevalence surveys were performed of occupation of single rooms 
at three-month intervals to ascertain the reasons for and distribution of 
usage of single rooms for isolation. The number and proportion of total beds 
that were in single rooms were recorded by ward. 
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3.4. Prospective comparison of 'failure to isolate'patients 
with clinically ascertained MRSA and number of new clinical 
MRSA isolates by ward. 
3.4.1 Study design 
The study was a prospective observational study without any intervention, 
combined with prospective surveillance of the incidence of MRSA identified 
from specimens obtained for clinical reasons over the same period. 
3.4.2. Data collection 
The incidence of new MRSA isolates obtained by diagnostic testing (as 
opposed to by screening) per ward was measured. A new MRSA isolate 
was defined as MRSA identified in a clinical specimen taken > 72 hours after 
the patient's admission when there was no known history of MRSA 
colonisation or infection. MRSA isolated < 72 hours after admission was 
designated as 'community-acquired'. If the patient had been transferred 
from another ward in the same hospital within the previous 72 hours, the 
MRSA was assigned to the previous ward. The rate of 'failure to isolate' of 
patients in whom MRSA was identified from specimens obtained for clinical 
reasons and for whom a member of the infection control team had required 
isolation, per 100 isolation requirements was calculated for each ward thus: 
Number of 'failures to isolate' during study period 
Number of requests for isolation during study period 
x 100 
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3.5. Prospective observational study of MRSA acquisition 
comparing the contacts of index cases who were isolated 
with those who were not isolated. 
3.5.1. Study design 
The study was a prospective, observational study without any intervention. 
3.5.2. Power calculation 
Any a priori power calculation could only guide the feasibility of the study as 
the period for data collection was limited to one calendar year for resource 
and logistical reasons. There were no pilot or published data on which to 
base a power calculation, however a crude calculation, using the 
methodology described by Altman 278 and assuming zero transmission from 
isolated index cases, indicated that 314 contacts would need to be included 
to detect a difference in MRSA transmission of 5% (at 85% power) and 191 
contacts to detect a 10% difference (i. e. 0% of contacts of isolated index 
cases and > 10% of contacts of non isolated cases acquiring MRSA). 
Less than 5% difference was deemed to be too low to be clinically 
acceptable as a rationale for isolation but it was estimated, based on local 
historical data, that approximately 300 contacts would be available within the 
12-month period of data collection. Thus the study was deemed to be 
feasible in the timescale available. 
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3.5.3. Data collection 
Data were collected prospectively for one calendar year from August 2004 to 
July 2005. An index case was defined as a patient from whom MRSA has 
been identified in a specimen obtained for clinical purposes and from whom 
MRSA has not been identified during their current hospital stay. 
Following identification of an index case and a recommendation to isolate 
there are two possible scenarios: 'the patient isolated' or 'the patient not 
isolated and remains in a multi-bedded bay or room'. In each situation the 
decision to recommend isolation was taken by either an Infection Control 
Nurse or Consultant Medical Microbiologist. This assessment took into 
consideration those factors that may increase or decrease the risk of 
transmission to, and subsequent clinical infection in susceptible patients 
using the guidance that was extant at the time of the study. 
189 In each 
scenario, patients adjacent to the index case (i. e. in the same bay or in 
adjoining and facing beds, depending on ward layout) were identified. These 
adjacent patients had up to three serial nasal swabs, taken at the intervals 
described below, to determine whether MRSA acquisition occurred. Swabs 
were taken using a single sterile swab to sample both anterior nares of each 
patient. Serial swabbing started within 24 hours of the identification and risk 
assessment with isolation, or not, of the index case (described 
hereafter as 
day 0). Subsequent swabs were taken at; swab 2- between 48 and 
72 hours 
after day 0 and swab 3- on the day of discharge or 
transfer or day 14 
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whichever occurred first. All swabs were processed within two hours of 
collection. 
The use of nasal swabs without enrichment was a pragmatic choice, based 
on anecdotal experience of point-prevalence surveys. There is a lack of 
high-quality evidence on the optimal strategy for identification of MRSA 
colonisation; 163 nasal screening alone, however, can identify > 90% of 
colonised individua IS279 and is considerably less intrusive than swabbing 
multiple sites which may have caused patients to refuse their consent. In 
addition, there was no requirement to pool swabs from different body sites in 
this study which eliminated one advantage of using an enrichment broth. 
There was also some concern that enrichment may identify very small 
numbers of MRSA in an individual that do not represent genuine colonisation 
but, rather, transient carriage only. 
Contacts in whom MRSA was identified by the screening specific to this 
study did not become index cases in their own right unless MRSA was 
subsequently isolated from a clinical specimen. In practice this occurred only 
rarely and the subsequent contacts of these 'contact becoming index' cases 
were different individuals from those of the original inclex. 
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3.5.3.1. Risk factor data 
Data were collected on risk factors in both index cases (risk factors for 
increased transmission) and contacts (risk factors for acquisition). 
Individuals with clinical infection, particularly of the respiratory tract or large 
wounds e. g. burns and those with exfoliating skin disease are considered to 
be more likely to be 'dispersers' of staphylococci including MRSA thus 
making transmission more likely. 189For each index case, in addition to basic 
demographic data and location, data were collected on: the type of 
specimen from which MRSA isolated, the presence or absence of symptoms 
of infection and the outcome of the infection-control risk assessment 
(isolation required or not). 
For contacts, in addition to basic demographic data and location, data were 
collected on putative risk factors for MRSA acquisition (see 1.3.5.1) i. e. 
presence of intravascular catheters, pressure sores, surgical procedures, 
underlying disease severity (Charlson co-morbidity index 280-282 and see 
Appendix D), length of hospital stay (prior to day 0), nasogastric tube, enteral 
feeding, number of ward transfers (prior to day 0), dermatological condition 
and exposure to antibiotics within the last month. 
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3.5.1. Microbiological methods 
3.5.1.1. Identification of MRSA 
Nasal swabs were streaked onto Columbia blood agar (E&O Laboratories 
Ltd, Bonnybridge, UK) and incubated aerobically at 37' C for 48 hours. 
Colonies resembling Staphylococcus aureus were tested using latex 
agglutination for bound coagulase, protein A and capsular polysaccharides 
(Pastorex Staph-Plus, Bio-Rad, Marnes-la-Coquette, France. ) Positive latex 
agglutination tests were confirmed as S. aureus by spot inoculation onto 
deoxyribonuclease test agar (E&O Laboratories Ltd. ), incubation overnight 
(minimum 15 hours) at 370 C and flooding with 1M hydrochloric acid with 
visual inspection for deoxyribonuclease activity. Susceptibility testing to 
meticillin was performed by incubation overnight at 300 C on Iso-Sensitest 
agar (E&O Laboratories Ltd) overlaid with meticillin 25 pg strips (Mast 
Diagnostics, Merseyside, UK) Positive (MRSA NCTC 10442) and negative 
(meticillin sensitive S. aureus NCTC 6571) controls were included with each 
test. 
Local data and experience support the utility and accuracy of using meticillin 
strips to determine susceptibility to meticillin in S. aureus in epidemiological 
studies as opposed to the testing of clinical specimens (Mark H Wilcox; 
personal communication). The definitive test to identify resistance to 
meticillin is to determine the presence of the mec gene using molecular 
techniques however this was considered to be impractical and too costly for 
the purpose of this study. 
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3.5.4.2. Thage typing 
Study isolates of MRSA and 12 control strains were inoculated into peptone 
water and incubated overnight at 370 C. Seven of the control strains used 
were MRSA including EMRSA 15 and EMRSA 16 After heat-shocking at 
56'C for 2 minutes 283 284 inoculated peptone waters were poured onto 
phage agar plates (Leeds Teaching Hospitals, Department of Microbiology), 
excess liquid removed and allowed to dry. After drying, plates were 
inoculated with the phage pattern shown in figure 1 at 100 x Routine Test 
Dilution (RTD) using a multipoint inoculator and incubated overnight at 300 C. 
Plates were read visually and checked by a second observer who was 
blinded to the results recorded by the first observer. Disagreements in 
interpretation were resolved by referral to a third colleague to achieve 
consensus. 
The results were recorded by looking for visible plaques in the confluent 
stapyloccocal growth and recorded as follows: 
0 plaques = no reaction 
1 to 9 plaques = weak reaction (with the number of plaques recorded) 
10 to 19 plaques = weak reaction 
20 to 50 plaques = strong reaction (noted as 
50 plaques = strong reaction (noted as '++') 
Any tests considered to be inconclusive or with no reactions were repeated - 
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Figure 1. Block loading pattern of bacteriophage at 100x Routine Test 
Dilution (100x RTD) for'phage typing of MRSA using a multipoint innoculator 
932 83C 
29 52 52A 79 80 
3A 3C 55 75x* 95 
6 42E 47 53 54 
75 77 83A 84 85 
81 94 96 88A 90 
* bacteriophage 75 at 1000 RTD 
3.5.5. Pulsed Field Gel Electrophoresis (PFGE) 
3.5.5.1. Descriptions of buffer solutions used in PFGE 
TEN buffer (200 ml solution) - 20 ml of 1 Molar(M) TRIS-HCI solution 
(pH 8.0), 40 ml 0.5 M EDTA Na2 and 1.76 g sodium chloride in 140 ml 
distilled water. 
EC lysis buffer (400 ml solution) - 2.4 ml of 1M TRIS-HCI solution (pH 8.0), 
23.36 g sodium chloride, 80 ml 0.5 M EDTA Na2,2 g N-lauryl sacosine and 
0.8 g deoxycholic acid in 318 ml distilled water. 
TE buffer (500 ml solution) -5 ml of 1M TRIS-HCI solution (pH 8.0) and 
1 ml 0.5 M EDTA Na2 in 494 ml distilled water. 
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3.5.5.2. PFGE method 
All MRSA isolates that were indistinguishable by 'phage typing were 
characterised further using PFGE. Isolates were incubated in 5 ml 2x yeast 
extra ct/trypto ne broth + 0.5% glycine broth at 370 C overnight on a rotary 
shaker set at 100 revolutions per minute (rpm) . After harvesting from 0.7 ml 
broth using low speed (6,500 rpm) microcentrifuge and washing with TEN 
buffer, cells were harvested as before and lysed using 2 pL of 1 mg/ml 
lysostaphin with 0.3 ml EC lysis buffer. After vortexing, the bacterial 
suspension was mixed with 0.3 ml molten 2% low melting point agarose. 
After vortexing briefly, 100 pL of the above solution was pipetted into block 
moulds and cooled at 40C for 20 minutes. Once cooled, agarose blocks 
containing bacterial DNA were incubated for 1 hour at 370C in EC lysis 
buffer and 1 hour at 550 C in TE buffer. 
After four washes in TE buffer for 30 minutes, blocks were stored at 4'C 
prior to digestion and electrophoresis. Digestion of the bacterial DNA within 
the blocks was achieved by incubating approximately 1/3 of each block in 
10 units of Smal restriction endonuclease for 4 hours at 30'C. The PFGE 
gel was assembled by transferring one digested block onto each tooth of the 
gel comb and the pouring of 100 ml of molten 1% PFGE-grade agarose gel. 
AX DNA ladder (BioLabs, New England) was also loaded onto each end of 
the gel as a size reference for the digested fragments. The k ladder 
contained successively larger concatemers of k DNA at 48.5 kilobase 
intervals from 48.5 to 727.5 kilobases. Following this, the gel was allowed to 
Page 88 of 195 
set before PFGE was performed using the CHEF 11 MAPPER Pulsed-Field 
Gel Electrophoresis System (Bio-Rad Laboratories, Hemel Hempstead) with 
settings of: field strength 6 volts/cm, pulse times: 5- 15 seconds for 10 hours 
followed by 15 - 60 seconds for 13 hours (total running time 23 hours). 
Following electrophoresis, gels were stained with 0.1 pg/ml ethidium 
bromide for 1 hour on a rotating platform and were then rinsed in distilled 
water. Gel images were recorded using Gene Genius Gel Imaging System 
(Syngene Ltd. ). 
DNA profiles for index cases and contacts were analysed using BioNumerics 
software (Applied Maths Biosysternetica) Dendrograms were constructed 
and comparisons made using the unweighted pair group method using the 
Dice correlation coefficient. 
The relatedness of the index case and contact strains was assessed using 
the criteria for bacterial strain typing formulated by Tenover et al 66 and 
considered suitable for short term epidemiological studies. For the purposes 
of this study where indexes and contacts were epidemiologically connected 
to each other in time and place isolates were considered to be related if they 
met the criteria for 'indistinguishable' or 'closely related' but not if they were 
'possibly related' or 'different' as described by Tenover and colleagues 
(Table 1) 
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Table 1: Relatedness criteria for bacterial strain typing (adapted from 
Tenover et al 66) 
Relatedness Number of Number of band 
independent genetic differences 
differences 
--fn-c-Fisfing-uisha-ble -0-0- 
Closely related 1 2-3 
Possibly related 2 4-6 
Unrelated 3 or more 7 or more 
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3.6 Statistical analysis 
Continuous non-parametric data were compared using Spearman's 
correlation coefficient. Analysis of categorical data was done using 
,X2 Pearson's , or 
Fisher's exact test as appropriate. The mean values of 
non-parametric data were compared using the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test. 
Analysis of risk factors using both categorical and continuous predictor 
variables with a categorical dependent variable was performed using forced 
entry multivariate logistic regression analysis. All risk factors that were 
significant at the p<0.2 level were included in the model. The model fit and 
explanatory value were assessed using the Nagelkerke R2 statistic and its 
2 
associated X statistic as well as examination of the standardised residuals, 
Cook's statistic for standardised leverage and Dbeta statistics for all 
predictor variables. 285 In all cases p<0.05 was considered to be statistically 
significant. All statistical analyses were performed using SPSS Version 
11.5.0 (SPSS Inc. Chicago, USA). 
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4. Results 
4.1. Prospective evaluation of patient isolation requirements 
and isolation room capacity 
During the 12-month data-collection period there were 845 requirements for 
patient isolation for the purposes of infection control, of which 185 (22%) 
were considered as 'failures to isolate' within the first 24 hours from the time 
of risk assessment. Figures 2 and 3, respectively show the proportions of 
requests per pathogen/infection category, and the 'failures to isolate' as 
proportions of the total requests per pathogen/infection category. The 
reasons for'failure to isolate' are detailed in Table 11. 
Table III details the breakdown of provision of single room, the demand for 
isolation facilities (expressed as number of requirements for isolation per 
1000 patient days) and the number of 'failures to isolate' per 100 requests by 
clinical speciality. 
A comparison between the proportion of beds that were single rooms and 
the number of 'failures to isolate' per 100 requirements (by ward) is shown in 
Figure 4; there was a statistically-significant inverse correlation between 
these two variables (Spearman's p=-0.372; p=0.002). 
Over the four point-prevalence surveys the total numbers of available 
hospital beds varied between 1129 and 1151, and the numbers of single 
rooms between 194 and 207 (17-18% of all hospital beds). The median 
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number of single rooms (percentage of total beds) by hospital wing in order 
of the age of the buildings (oldest first) was 2 (16%), 3 (17%) and 2 (18%). 
There were 25 to 36 unoccupied single rooms (13-17% of all single rooms) 
and 24 to 36 (12-19%) were being used for isolation of patients for the 
purposes of infection control. Between 4 and 6 patients were in single 
rooms for 'protective isolation', the majority on the haernatology ward. 
The median duration of 'failure to isolate' was four days (inter-quartile range 
two to eight days, range 1 to 31 days). In one year, assuming 100% bed 
occupancy, there were -3,500 patient days of exposure to cases with 
potentially transmissible pathogens when isolation was not possible. As 
100% bed occupancy is not the norm in a typical acute hospital but bed 
occupancy rates are generally high, the above estimate can be recalculated 
using a realistic range of bed occupancy estimates, based on local 
knowledge and experience, of between 85% and 95%. 
A bed occupancy estimate of 85% would give an estimate of -3000 patient 
days of exposure and using 95% gives an estimate of - 3,300 patient days. 
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Figure 2 Distribution of reasons for isolation for the purposes of infection 
control by organism or condition 
Percentage of Requests for Isolation by Organism/Condition 
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"Other resistant bacteria" - includes glycopeptide-resistant enterococci, 
penicillin-resistant pneumococci, multi-resistant Gram-negative bacteria 
(other than those that produce an ESBL) and Acinetobacter spp. 
"Other enteric pathogens" - includes all enteric pathogens except 
Clostridium difficile (including suspected infectious diarrhoea and vomiting). 
"Other organisms/conditions" - includes pulmonary tuberculosis (known and 
suspected), chicken pox and shingles, respiratory viruses and 
meningococcal infection. 
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Figure 3 'Failures to isolate' as a proportion (numbers of cases given in the bars) of the total requirements per organisms or condition 




n Percentage of Successful Isolations 
r-1 Percentage of Failures to Isolate 
"Other resistant bacteria" - includes glycopeptide-resistant enterococci, 
penicillin-resistant pneumococcl, multi-resistant Gram-negative bacteria 
(other than those that produce an ESBL) and Acinetobacter spp. 
"Other enteric pathogens" - includes all enteric pathogens except 
Clostridium difficile (including suspected infectious diarrhoea and vomiting). 
"Other organ isms/conditions" - includes pulmonary tuberculosis (known and 
suspected), chicken pox and shingles, respiratory viruses and 
meningococcal infection. 
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Table 11 Categories of reasons given by ward staff for'failures to isolate' 
patients (n = 185*) 
Reason for 'failure to isolate' No. of occurrences* 
Ward/dept. has no single rooms 53 
Single rooms occupied with isolated 63 
patients (infection control reasons) 
Male/female bed availability (e. g. all 26 
males in single rooms and no male 
empty beds on ward) 
Patient reasons (safety, observation, 28 
behavioural etc. ) 
Rooms occupied - other reasons (e. g. 29 
terminal care or disruptive patient) 
Others (e. g. room being refurbished, 9 
ICU full & too busy to manage transfer, 
staffing) 
* Each 'failure to isolate' episode may have more than one reason given 
where there were >1 unavailable single room with different reasons for their 
unavailability e. g. one single room occupied by an isolated patient and a 
second unavailable because of male/female bed availability. 
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Table III Provision of single rooms, the demand for isolation facilities 
(expressed as number of requirements for isolation per 1000 
patient days) and the number of 'failures to isolate' per 100 
requests by clinical speciality. 
Speciality Total Median 




















it I n-t ensive 16 
a jr, e U7 Care Units 
Adult ENT 50 1 4 
Cardiology L 66 4 15 10 
Cardiothoracic 
Surgery 
74 4 11 1.7 5 
Elderly Me-dli-c-in-e---ý 117 2 8 33 
Gastroenterology 30 6 20 
General Medicine 88 2 8 0.8 7 
General Suýr ýe 113 3 11 1.7 35 
Haematolojj------] 14 14 1 100 1.7 0 
Neonatal Units 50 1 8 0.3 14 
Neurosciences 65 3 14 1.9 5 Tý 
Obstetrics/ 
gynaecology 
78 6 23 0.2 0 
Ortbopaedics 70 2 10 1.7 1 
Paediatrics (all) 125 2 26 2.2 7 














52 6 38 3.6 1 10 
Notes 
1. Includes Neuro HDU with 23 failures from 23 requests 
(no single rooms) 
2. Dermatology, Breast care and ophthalmology 
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Figure 4 Scatter plot of 'failure to isolate' per 100 requirements and 
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4.2. Prospective comparison Of 'failure to isolate'patients 
with clinically ascertained MRSA and number of new clinical 
MRSA isolates by ward 
The number of new MRSA isolates per 1000 patient days ranged from 0 to 
5.48 (median 0.69, inter-quartile range 0.28 to 1.1) the data were heavily 
skewed towards the lower end of the scale. 'Failure to isolate' per 100 
requirements for isolation (MRSA only) ranged by ward from 0 (58% of the 
wards) to 100 (8% of the wards) these data were also heavily skewed 
towards 0 (median 0, inter-quartile range 0 to 22.5). For both of the above, 
n= 60 wards. There was a statistical ly-sig n if ica nt correlation between the 
number of "failures to isolate" (MRSA only) per 100 requests and the 
number of new MRSA isolates per 1000 patient days 
(Spearman'sp correlation coefficient = 0.596, p<0.001, Figure 5). 
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Figure 5 Scatter plot of MRSA incidence per 1000 patient days and 'failures 
to isolate' (MRSA cases only) per 100 requirements by ward 






0 20 40 60 







Page 100 of 195 
4.3. Prospective observational study of MRSA acquisition 
comparing the contacts of index cases who were isolated 
with index cases who were not isolated 
A total of 146 index cases were included in the study with 301 contacts 
(approximately two contacts per index case, range one to three). Two index 
cases had to be excluded from the analysis because of failure to recover 
isolates from frozen storage for typing, in one case ('failure to isolate' case 
with two contacts) the index case isolate could not be recovered and in the 
other case (successful isolation case with three contacts) none of the contact 
isolates could be recovered. The remaining 144 index cases had 296 
contacts, 53 index cases were isolated with 119 contacts and 91 index cases 
were not isolated with 177 contacts. Seventy four contacts, 32 (27%) of 
index cases who were isolated and 42 (24%) of index cases who were not 
isolated, who were discharged or who were transferred after having an initial 
nasal swab on day 0 from which MRSA was not isolated, but before any 
further swabs could be taken, could not be included in the analysis. 
The data pertaining to demographics and risk factors for this group are 
compared with those included in the analysis in Table IV. Contacts that could 
not be included were more likely to have an index case who was assessed 
as requiring isolation (p = 0.04, y, 2) and to have a dermatological condition 
(p = 0.047, X2) . 
Fourteen index cases had no contacts that could be included 
in the analysis, thus 222 contacts (87 contacts of 50 isolated 
index cases 
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and 135 contacts of 80 not-isolated index cases) were included in the 
analysis. 
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Table IV Comparison of demographic and risk factor data between those 
contacts included in and those excluded from the analysis. 
Demographic and Contacts included contacts not Comments 
risk factor data in the analysis included in the 
n 222 analysis n= 74 
Gender 61 49 NS 
(%male) 
Age (mean) 71 68 NS 
Index case 40 -NS 
isolated 
N 






surgical 34 35 NS 
medical 38 43 NS 
elderly medical 22 12 NS 
ICU/HDU 6 10 NS 
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Table IV (continued) 
Demographic and Contacts included contacts not Comments 
risk factor data in the analysis included in the 




fluid 1 4 NS 
sputum 27 28 NS 
wound swab 45 49 NS 
blood culture 12 6 NS 
urine 5 4 NS 
tip 2 0 NS 
other swab 9 5 NS 
pus 1 0 NS 
Index case has 40 30 NS 
clinical infection 
N 








Pressure ulcers 1 0 
NS 
N 
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Table IV (concluded) 
Demographic and Contacts included contacts not Comments 
risk factor data in the analysis included in the 
n= 222 analysis n= 74 
Charlson 78 74 NS 
co-morbidity 
index score <3 
N 
Surgery during 24 20 NS 
this admission 
N 
Days from 6 7 NS 
admission to day 
0 
(median) 
Presence of 6 5 NS 
nasogastric tube 
N 
Number of ward 0 0 NS 
transfers (median) 
Enteral feeding I I NS 
N 




Exposure to 45 42 NS 
antibiotics 
(all classes, %) 
NS = Not significant (p < 0.05), a= Fisher's exact test. 
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MRSA was isolated from at least one nasal swab in 58 (26%) of 
222 contacts that were included in the analysis. In 42 (19% of 222 contacts) 
of these cases MRSA was isolated from the first swab taken on day 0. 
Seventeen (8%) of these had an isolate that was indistinguishable by 'phage 
typing and PFGE from that of their index patient. The remaining 16 (7%) 
contacts from whom MRSA was isolated were initially negative for MRSA on 
day 0 and were considered to have acquired MRSA after day 0. Of these, 5 
(2% of 222) acquired a strain of MRSA that was indistinguishable by 'phage 
typing and PFGE from that of their index patient. Index patients who were 
isolated had three contacts who acquired an indistinguishable strain of 
MRSA and index patients who were not isolated had two, the difference was 
not significant (p = 0.383, Fisher's exact test). 
Three outcome measures were analysed for the contacts using univanate 
and multivariate analysis; firstly the identification of MRSA from any of the up 
to three swabs taken from each contact, described as'MRSA positive at any 
time'. Secondly the identification of MRSA in a swab taken from a contact 
from whose initial swab at day 0, MRSA was not identified, described as 
'MRSA-acquired'. Thirdly the same scenario as the second outcome where 
also the index and contact isolates were considered to be indistinguishable 
or closely related using PFGE (see 3.5.5.2), described as 'MRSA-acquired 
(isolate indistinguishable)' 
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Analysis of the risk factors for these three outcomes; 'MRSA positive at any 
tirne', 'MRSA-acquired' and 'MRSA-acquired (isolate indistinguishable)' are 
given in Table V (subject to univariate analysis) and Table VI (subject to 
multivariate analysis). Risk factors that were significant at p<0.2 in 
univariate analysis were included in the multivariate analysis. 
Page 107 of 195 
Table V Univariate analysis of risk factors for MRSA acquisition 
Outcome 




...... .............. .. Risk Factor significance in univariate logistic regression 
expressed as ap value 
Contact gender 0.645 0.916 0.401 
Contact age 0.117 a 0.66 0.870 
index risk 0.024 a 0.222 0.174 a 
assessed as 
requiring isolation 
Index case 0.819 0.361 0.457 
isolated or not 
Medical specialty 0.073 a 0.787 0.088 a 
(surgical) (medical) 
Index case 0.115 a 0.661 0.498 
specimen type (sputum) 
Index - signs of 0.348 0.166a 0.1015 
clinical infection 
Index - 0.115 a 0.422 0.662 
dermatology 
condition 
Presence of 0.506 0.857 0.325 
intravascular 
catheter 
Pressure ulcers 0.776 0.627 0.791 
Charlson 0.732 0.708 0.891 
co-morbidity 
index >3 
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Table V (concluded) 
Outcome 




............................... .... . ..... . ............... Risk Factor ....... ............. . ..... .......... significance in univariate logistic regression 
expressed as ap value 
Surgery during 0.956 0.913 0.838 
this admission 
Length of stay 0.064a 0.765 0.700 
prior to day 0 
Presence of 0.027 a 0.255 0.573 
nasogastric tube 
No. of ward 0.106 a 0.692 0.1 09a 
transfers prior to 
day 0 
Enteral. feeding 0.460 0.069a 0.829 
Contact - 0.317 0.473 0.06 8a 
dermatology 
condition 
Exposure to 0.073 a 0.057 a 0.15 a 
antibiotics (all 
classes) 
penicillins 0.768 0.03 0a 0.482 
cephalosporins 0.942 0.902 0.671 
aminoglycosides 0.685 0.382 0.706 
macrolides 0.027 a 0.00 1a 0.00 1a 
trimethoprim 0.927 0.321 0.589 
metronidazole 0.440 0.447 0.619 
quinolones 0.001a 0.0985 0.073 
a 
significant at p "' .2 and included 
in the multivariate model 
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Table VI Significant risk factors for MRSA acquisition after multivariate logistic regression analysis. 
Outcome - MRSA positive at any time 
X2 Model 
, =30. 
ll, p<0.001, R2=0. l86 
Risk Factor exp b (95% CI) P 
Exposure to quinolones 4.31 (1.58 to 11.74) 0.004 
Presence of nasogastric tube 4.07 (1.21 to 13.75) 0.023 
Index case risk assessed as 
requiring isolation 
2.35 (1.09 to 5.04) 0.029 
Outcome - MRSA acquired 
X2 =2 Model , 
19.54, p=0.003, R=0.208 
............. .... - ............. . ......... I............................................. ............... I ........... I .................................. ................ ............ ............... . ...................... -. - ........... ......... ..... --- ............... Risk Factor exp b (95% CI) P 
Enteral feeding* 30.54 (1.56 to 598.95)* 0.024* 
Exposure to macrolides 7.14 (1.60 to 31.77) 0.010 
Outcome - MRSA acquired, indistinguishable 
Model y, 2= 20.72, p =. 004, R2 =. 460 
. ........... ................................................. .......... ............................ ..................................................... ....................... I ............................................ ........................ Risk Factor exp b (95% CI) P 
Exposure to macrolides 21.51 (1.11 to 418.40) 0.043 
Contact - dermatology 
condition 
45.62 (1.30 to 1604.25) 0.035 
*The model may be influenced by one case with high values for 'Cook's 
statistic' and 'DBeta'which indicate an undue influence on the model. 
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4.3.1. MRSA'phage typing results 
One hundred and sixty two MRSA isolates from 109 patients were 'phage 
typed, the relative proportions of the different 'phage types identified are 
W. 
shown in Figure 6 (n = 162 isolates). Analysis of 'phage types by broad 
hospital speciality showed that EMRSA type 15 was the predominant type in 
all specialities, with >50% of isolates belonging to this type. 
Figure 6 The relative proportions of the different 'phage types Identified 
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4.3.2. Pulse Field Gel Electrophoresis results 
Figure 7 shows a dendrogram describing the degree of relatedness of the 
MRSA strains isolated from all patients in the study, both index cases and 
contacts, which were analysed using PFGE. This includes all cases where 
the index case and epidemiologically-related contact had MRSA strains that 
were indistinguishable by 'phage typing. The patients were numbered 
sequentially for the purposes of identification and for each contact the 
corresponding index patient number is given. The vertical line represents a 
cut-off point of 80% relatedness. This cut-off point represents approximately 
the definition of two strains being 'closely related' as described by Tenover et 
a f6 (see 3.5-5.2). 
The dendrogram shows a high level of relatedness overall reflecting the very 
high proportion of strains that were classifies as EMRSA 15 using 'phage 
typing and the fact that the patients were all in the same hospital over a 
period of one year; however only index cases and their contacts were related 
specifically to each other epidemiologically. 
Table VII Shows the index patients and their contacts as pairs and gives the 
percentage degree of relatedness of their MRSA strains and the 
corresponding definition according to the criteria Of Tenover et a f6 - Again, 
this demonstrates the high level of relatedness of the dataset as a whole; the 
most common finding between pairs is one of 'closely related' whilst 
'indistinguishable' and 'unrelated' are rare. 
Page 112 of 195 
Figure 7 Analysis of PFGE profiles of MRSA strains from indexes and 
contacts 
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5. Discussion 
The NHS in England and Wales is currently in the middle of an 
unprecedented programme of hospital building with approximately 110 new 
hospitals being built at a cost of approaching E30 billion. 286 The question of 
the size and nature of the need for isolation facilities has never been timelier. 
Patient isolation to limit the spread of nosocomial pathogens is a mainstay of 
infection prevention and control programmes worldwide. However, the true 
efficacy of isolation as a control measure for some organisms, in particular 
MRSA, remains uncertain. 197 198 Clearly, the effectiveness of isolation in 
preventing the transmission of HAI pathogens will, at least in part, be 
governed by the supply of and the demand for single rooms. 
This study demonstrates a major mismatch between demand for and supply 
of isolation room facilities. Approximately one in five requests for patient 
isolation was not met during this 12-month period. There are no other 
published reports in the literature that have examined the use of single 
rooms using this method but those that have conducted point-prevalence 
surveys of the use of single rooms have reported findings that were similar to 
those in this study, i. e. single rooms that were occupied by patients who 
were not suffering from an infection, while patients who are deemed to carry 
a risk of transmitting infection remain on open wards. 
234235 In addition, those 
studies that have examined the use of isolation rooms in infectious disease 
facilities have also found a mismatch between their intended and actual 
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use. 232 233 The extent to which these findings reflect the situation in other 
UK hospitals is not known, however the available evidence and anecdotal 
knowledge suggests that they are unlikely to differ markedly in other 
comparable large NHS hospitals. 
Requests for isolation of patients for the purposes of infection control are 
made as part of a risk assessment of the likely transmissibility of pathogens, 
in line with standard UK practice. The main driver for the isolation of a 
patient for the purposes of infection control in this study was MRSA 
carriage/infection, which accounted for almost half of all such requests. The 
incidence of MRSA infection in the study hospital, as judged by national 
surveillance of MRSA bacteraernia, is similar to that in other large, specialist 
hospitals in England. 277 The prevalence of MRSA, at approximately 40% of 
all S. aureus isolates, is also similar to comparable hospitals. The absence 
of any previous national guidance for, or published data on, the availability of 
isolation rooms also hinders comparison of the capacity of single rooms 
locally with that in other NHS hospitals; however, approximately 17% of beds 
in the study hospital were in single rooms, and according to NHS Estates 
'the NHS rarely provides more than 20% single rooms in its hospitals'. 229 
The lack of progress over time in increasing the proportion of beds that are 
single rooms in hospital buildings is illustrated by the percentage of beds 
provided in single rooms being almost identical in the three main hospital 
buildings, despite a gap of more than 100 years between construction of the 
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oldest (c 1880) and newest (1998); although the oldest of these has 
undergone some refurbishment over time. 
Comparison of isolation facilities by clinical specialty demonstrated a 
significant variation in the provision of, demand for and availability of single 
rooms. 'Failure to isolate' was consistently high in wards for General 
Medicine, Surgery and Elderly Medicine. By contrast, in Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology and Paediatrics, where provision of single rooms was relatively 
high, the demand for isolation for the purposes of infection control was very 
low and thus 'failures to isolate' were rare. The significant inverse correlation 
between the proportion of single rooms and increased 'failure to isolate' is 
unsurprising. Notably, in only one case where a ward had > 30% of its beds 
provided in single rooms, there was an instance of 'failure to isolate'. This 
may support the current NHS guidance on the provision of single rooms, 
though this is limited to design specifications for new hospitals and 
departments only, that recommends at least 50% of the total beds should be 
provided in single rooms. 227 Interestingly, this study identified that the great 
majority (81-88%) of single rooms were being occupied for reasons other 
than infection control requirements. 
The capacity to isolate a patient on request may be influenced by a number 
of factors, including the proportion of beds that are in single rooms, the bed 
occupancy rate, the policies and protocols for risk assessment that are in 
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place (e. g. whether patients with MRSA colonisation are isolated), the use of 
mixed-sex wards and the prevalence of organisms/conditions requiring 
isolation. The majority of requests for patient isolation in this study related to 
either MRSA colon isation/i nfectio n or ClOstridium difficile diarrhoea. This 
reflects the high endemic level of these pathogens in UK hospitals. It is 
important to note that in the study hospital routine screening for MRSA 
carriage was not practised at the time of these studies. Instead, patients 
were isolated who were identified as infected or, sometimes, simply 
colonised with MRSA through clinical sampling, according to risk 
assessment as recommended in the UK guidelines that were extant at the 
time of the study 189 . It is therefore conceivable that if widespread screening 
was carried out this would identify a larger number of patients colonised with 
MRSA, which would increase the size of the gap between demand for and 
supply of single rooms. For the majority of microorganisms and infections 
the proportions of 'failures to isolate' were consistently around 20%, the only 
exceptions being microorganisms/infections for which isolation is considered 
mandatory (for example, untreated pulmonary tuberculosis), and those 
occurring predominantly in children (for example, rotavirus). The length of 
time that 'failure to isolate' persisted varied markedly; although most cases 
were resolved within 5 days, a small number lasted 2-3 weeks. The reasons 
for these longer durations include the need for specialist (e. g. high 
dependency) care, which was not available in isolation in a single room. 
Occasionally, the long duration of 'failure to isolate' may be exacerbated by 
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an inability to review cases daily to determine if the infection-control risk 
assessment has changed. 
In the event of 'failure to isolate', patients are managed in open areas of 
wards and departments using modified contact (barrier) precautions. 
Precise patient placement depends on risk assessment and the 
configuration of the ward or department. Subsequent risk of microorganism 
transmission is multi-factorial and hard to quantify. This risk is expressed as 
the number of patient days of exposure (assuming 100% bed occupancy). 
These data suggest that even if only a small proportion of exposures lead to 
nosocomial infection the consequences in terms of morbidity, mortality and 
healthcare costs will be significant. 287 The finding that there was a 
significant correlation between failing to isolate patients who had MRSA 
isolated from clinical specimens and the incidence of MRSA identified from 
clinical samples needs to be interpreted with care. The epidemiology of 
MRSA is complex and influenced by many risk factors related to both 
individual patients and the clinical setting. Correlation does not imply, and 
should not be interpreted as implying, cause and effect. Increased 'failure to 
isolate' could lead to higher incidence of MRSA colonisation and/or infection. 
It is also plausible that increased MRSA prevalence could lead to an 
increase in 'failure to isolate'. It is also possible that neither of these 
scenarios is true and that these data and this apparent relationship are 
confounded by one or more unknown factors. In particular antibiotic use has 
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been shown to affect MRSA infection rates at the ward or unit level. 120 It 
was intended to collect data on antibiotic usage by ward as part of this 
aspect of the study. Unfortunately, despite being apparently feasible in 
planning, it was not possible to make use of the available pharmacy data in 
this way because of problems with attributing antibiotic use to wards and 
departments as opposed to prescribing clinicians. In addition, 
non-parametric correlation was used because the data were unsuitable for 
linear regression. 
It was possible to categorise broadly the reasons for 'failure to isolate' 
patients. Some reasons for failing to isolate patients were clearly structural 
and related to the design and use of available facilities e. g. wards and 
departments designed and built (or inherited) without any single rooms. The 
use of mixed-sex wards also had a negative impact; on 26/185 (14%) of 
'failure to isolate' occasions a single room was unavailable because of the 
gender of its occupant and consequent inability to transfer them to the open 
ward. Attempts to reduce mixed-sex occupancy in the NHS have been 
mainly restricted to segregation of males and females within wards and 
departments and the provision of separate bathroom and toilet facilities, 
which has little bearing on usage of single rooms. 
288289 
The availability of single rooms is affected by cases already isolated with 
transmissible pathogens, and those in single rooms for other clinical reasons 
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such as terminal care or the appropriate management of disturbed or 
disruptive patients. More than one third of cases of 'failure to isolate' were 
due to the former. A broad category of 'failure to isolate' reasons relate to the 
perceived needs of, or risks to, the index patient e. g. the potential for 
physiological or psychological deterioration, or the need for care that cannot 
be delivered in isolation. These assessments by clinical staff need to be 
considered seriously as there is evidence that patients placed in isolation 
can suffer both psychological harm 
246-250 
and increased adverse events. 
254 
Patients may also require high-dependency or other specialised care which 
militates against isolation needs. 
The necessity for, and the efficacy of, isolation for the prevention of 
transmission of organisms that are spread via the airborne route is based on 
a strong theoretical rationale. Airborne transmission of organisms such as 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis and varicella zoster virus has been 
demonstrated 220 and, while controlled trials would certainly be rejected on 
ethical grounds, using isolation, ideally with controlled ventilation, to prevent 
such transmission is universally accepted and uncontroversial. This is not 
the case for organisms spread by contact; the finding in this prospective 
cohort study that there is no significant difference in the acquisition of 
genetically indistinguishable or closely related MRSA in adjacent contacts of 
index cases who were isolated and those who were not isolated adds to the 
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considerable debate about the efficacy of isolation in a single room in 
preventing pathogens spreading by this route, particularly MRSA. 
It has been established that isolation in a single room is not necessarily a 
benign practice. 
246-256 It is imperative from an ethical perspective, therefore, 
to establish whether the practice is effective in preventing the transmission of 
epidemiologically-important organisms. 
There are no other published studies that have prospectively examined 
MRSA transmission from an index patient to a cohort of adjacent contacts in 
this way. The only published study that is methodologically similar is that of 
Jernigan et al. 
290 This study was included in the systematic review by 
Cooper et al. 197 and described the use of contact precautions in controlling 
an outbreak of MRSA in a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). This study 
identified transmission using judgements based on the temporal and 
geographical relationships between putative index cases and cases of 
acquired MRSA. The authors reported a 16-fold difference in MRSA 
transmission from index cases who were isolated and those who were not 
isolated (RR 15.6,95% Cl 5.3 to 45.6, p<0.0001). These findings appear to 
support the use of contact precautions (including isolation in a single room) 
in preventing the transmission of MRSA but they may also be explained by 
regression to the mean as the majority of transmissions occurred at the 
beginning of outbreak (8 out of 15 in the first month of a five-month outbreak) 
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and a number of additional measures were introduced to quell the outbreak 
during this period. Other than this study, which they considered to provide 
only weak evidence of the efficacy of isolation, Cooper and colleagues 
identified that the overwhelming majority of published reports that claim that 
isolation is effective in preventing MRSA transmission are either, reports of 
outbreaks in which multiple uncontrolled interventions have apparently 
terminated the problem frequently with unplanned, retrospective analyses or, 
at best. prospective 'before and after' intervention studies. Of the studies 
they reviewed and considered to provide more robust evidence of efficacy 
(six in total) there was a mixture of outcomes with four supporting the 
efficacy of isolation and two not. It is also important to note that only three of 
these studies primarily used isolation in a single room; the remaining three 
were studies of isolation wards. 
Of the studies included in the subsequent systematic review by 
Loveday et al. 168 none addressed the impact, at the individual patient level, 
of isolation. Reviewing the studies that have been published since the period 
covered by these reviews identified one study by Bracco and colleagues 276 
set in an ICU that found a lower incidence of acquired MRSA in occupants of 
single rooms than those in open bays. As well as questioning the validity of 
these findings, due to the differences in the two groups being studied, it is 
also difficult to identify their applicability to practice as, normally; it is the 
potentially infectious individual that is placed in the single room as opposed 
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to those at risk of acquisition with the exception of those patients placed in 
protective isolation, this latter group of patients being such a small and 
unusual group that their management has little or no bearing on the wider 
debate about isolation. 
The findings of this study support those of Cepeda and colleagues 270 who 
found that isolation in a single room of patients with MRSA did not affect the 
rate of MRSA acquisition in two ICUs. Although the study of Cepeda and 
colleagues was set in ICU and didn't attempt to identify direct MRSA 
transmission it is similar to this study in one important aspect; it examined 
the specific impact of isolation in a single room without other simultaneous 
interventions. 
There are a number of potential explanations for the finding that isolation of 
index cases did not significantly affect the acquisition of genetically 
indistinguishable isolates of MRSA by their contacts when compared with the 
contacts of index cases who were not isolated. Although an airborne 
component to MRSA transmission has been suggested by some studies 155- 
159 the primary route of transmission is via direct or indirect contact and it is 
plausible that the isolation of individuals in single rooms does not prevent 
transmission by this route. Although use of a single room is advocated as a 
component of contact precautions it is only one of the interventions that 
make up these precautions and its individual contribution to transmission 
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may be relatively small when compared to the other components such as 
hand hygiene, equipment and environmental hygiene and the use of 
personal protective equipment e. g. gloves and aprons. The use of single 
rooms may be considered as a measure to improve compliance with the 
above measures, through raised awareness of the status of the isolated 
patient; however there are no studies to substantiate this and compliance 
with contact precautions is reported to be suboptimal at best and very poor 
at worst. 
240-245 If compliance with contact precautions was equally poor 
during this study it could provide another explanation for the apparent lack of 
effect associated with isolation. Were that the case, however, it could be 
argued that there would have been higher transmission rates in contacts of 
index cases, whether isolated or not. 
It is plausible that isolation in a single room of a patient in whom MRSA has 
been identified protects patients other than those who have been in the 
index case's immediate vicinity. If transmission occurs primarily via the 
hands of healthcare workers then the work patterns of the healthcare 
workers may influence who is placed at risk of MRSA acquisition i. e. those 
patients identified as 'contacts' in this study may, in some cases, be cared 
for by different healthcare workers than the index case; in addition other 
patients who were not adjacent to the index case could have been cared for 
by the same healthcare workers thus placing them at increased risk in the 
event of non-compliance with infection control precautions. This possibility 
Page 125 of 195 
could explain why studies such as that by Gastmeier et al. 
267 have identified 
an overall reduction in MRSA incidence when patients with MRSA are 
placed in single rooms. 
Another partial explanation of the apparent lack of transmission of MRSA 
from index cases to contacts in either scenario could be that 19% of the 
potential contacts were already colonised with MRSA on entry to the study 
(at day 0); given that these individuals were presumably at higher risk for 
MRSA acquisition, they may have been those who were most likely to have 
acquired it from their contact, if not already colonised. This finding and the 
fact that, at some point, one in four (26%) of all the contacts in this study had 
a nasal swab that yielded MRSA following culture reflects the endemic 
nature of MRSA and its high prevalence in the study setting. A recently 
published study of MRSA prevalence in residents of nursing homes in the 
same geographical area (Leeds UK) found a remarkably similar prevalence 
of MRSA nasal colonisation (22%). 291 It is unclear as to whether the 
prevalence of MRSA in this particular cohort of patients, /. e. those adjacent 
to patients in whom MRSA has been identified through clinical specimens, 
was higher than would be found in a bay of patients selected at random in 
which there were no known MRSA cases. It is, however, likely that this 
prevalence figure is an overestimate of the prevalence figure for the hospital 
as a whole as there are varying levels of MRSA incidence, as identified by 
the number of cases identified from clinical samples, among the different 
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clinical specialities. Therefore the sampling for this study was largely 
concentrated in those clinical specialities with the highest prevalence of 
MRSA rather than the average for the whole hospital. 
The results of the PFGE analysis demonstrate that there was a high level of 
relatedness among the majority of the strains of MRSA from both index 
cases and their epidemiologically related contacts, reflecting the very high 
proportion of strains that were classifies as EMRSA 15 using 'phage typing 
and the fact that the patients were all in the same hospital. For the purposes 
of the analysis, index and contact isolates of MRSA were considered to be 
related if they met the criteria for either 'indistinguishable' or 'closely related' 
as described by Tenover et a/66 . Given that, it is surprising to note that in a 
number of instances, the isolate derived from an apparent contact was 
unrelated to the relevant index case. Thus, detailed molecular typing shows 
that these apparent contact cases are, in fact, index cases in their own right. 
This adds a layer of complexity to the epidemiology presented in this thesis 
since the apparently simple epidemiological picture obtained using 
widely-applied typing tools may be misleading when a more discriminatory 
analysis is applied. It also follows from this that any measure of the spread 
of MRSA obtained using relatively simple typing is likely to be an 
overestimate of the ability of this bacterium to spread through this cohort f 
patients. This highlights the need to use typing tools that have a high 
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degree of discrimination when studying bacterial strains that are closely 
related. 
The risk factors for the acquisition of MRSA identified in this study add to the 
evidence that supports exposure to antibiotics in general and specific 
antibiotic classes in particular as a significant predictor of MRSA acquisition. 
Exposure to quinolones was a significant risk factor for the outcome 'MRSA 
at any time', i. e. including those contacts whose day 0 samples were positive 
for MRSA. Contacts who acquired MRSA, whether genetically related to that 
of their index case or not, were more likely to have received a quinolone than 
those who didn't acquire MRSA but this did not reach statistical significance. 
These findings reinforce those of a number of earlier studies that exposure 
to quinolones is an independent risk factor for MRSA acquisition. 
76 82 120 122 
125128-132 
In this study, exposure to a macrolide was a significant risk factor in 
univariate analysis for all outcomes and in multivariate analysis it remained 
an independent risk factor for acquired MRSA and acquired MRSA where 
the isolate was indistinguishable from that of the index case. Exposure to 
macrolides has only been reported rarely as a risk factor for MRSA 
acquisition, Onorato et al. 100, in a multivariate analysis, identified that 
exposure to one or more of a group of antibiotics that included macrolides 
was a risk factor for MRSA acquisition in patients infected with the Human 
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immunodeficiency Virus (HIV); however, they did not analyse the antibiotic 
classes separately and it may not be possible to extrapolate data from HIV 
patients to other populations. An older study (1993) by Shimada and 
colleagues 85 identified exposure to macrolides as well as aminoglycosides, 
tetracycline and carbapenems as being independently associated with 
MRSA surgical wound infection. This study did not attempt to identify risk 
factors for acquired MRSA colonisation. 
82 In the case-control study by Graffunder and Venezia macrolide exposure, 
as well as exposure to levofloxacin, was found to be an independent risk 
factor for nosocomial MRSA infection compared with MSSA infection. Unlike 
levofloxacin, however, macrolide exposure was not significant in a second 
model that included the number of grams administered. 
Muller et al. 120 examined the relationship between antibiotic use and the 
incidence of MRSA at the ward or unit level using an ecological approach. 
They found that the use of all classes of antibiotic, including macrolides 
(p = 0.004) was independently associated with higher MRSA incidence when 
controlled for 'colonisation pressure' and type of clinical speciality. The 
authors were unable to determine a hierarchy of risk among the different 
antimicrobial classes and while there was a linear dose-effect relationship 
between levels of usage and MRSA incidence with some classes of 
antibiotics (quinolones and cephalosporins); this was not true for macrolides 
where the effect tended to plateau. 
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Whereas specific mechanisms that may contribute to the impact of exposure 
to quinolones on MRSA incidence have been described, 131 132 134 this is not 
the case for macrolides; however, in common with quinolones, macrolides 
do achieve high skin concentrations 20 so similar mechanisms could be 
involved. There are other antibiotics that also achieve high skin 
concentrations e. g. tetracyclines and lincosamides but these are used much 
less frequently. It is possible that the association between macrolides and 
MRSA colonisation may be due to the fact that macrolides are excreted onto 
the skin which, in combination with their poor activity against MRSA means 
that they create a selective pressure that makes MRSA colonisation more 
likely to follow initial contact with the organism from, for example, 
cross-infection from another patient, member of staff or the inanimate 
environment. This effect may be less likely in other antibiotics that achieve 
high skin concentrations where such antibiotics are more active against 
MRSA e. g. tetracyclines. Further research is needed into any such potential 
mechanisms for this association. 
Overall, the results of this study reinforce the importance of exposure to 
antibiotics in the spread and acquisition of MRSA, quinolones are already 
strongly established as a risk factor but these results add to the smaller body 
of evidence that exposure to macrolides may also predispose to MRSA 
acquisition. 
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The finding that those index cases who were identified by the infection 
control nurse or doctor as 'requiring isolation' was independently a risk 
factor for the outcome of MRSA from any of the up to three swabs taken 
from each contact, described as 'MRSA positive at any time' but not for the 
outcomes associated with the acquisition of MRSA is difficult to interpret. In 
a situation where there are insufficient single rooms to isolate all cases of 
MRSA (whether colonised or infected), in addition to other epidemiologically 
important organisms e. g. Clostridium difficile, infection-control nurses and 
doctors are frequently required to decide if isolation is required using risk 
assessment. Although specific systems for risk assessment have been 
proposed, both for all isolation cases 
236 
and for MRSA specifica Ily, 
237-239 
most risk assessments are not done systematically, as was the case during 
this study. Such risk assessments were based on criteria such as whether 
the index case had a clinical infection, whether there was an opportunity for 
increased dissemination of the organism e. g. exfoliating skin conditions, 
open wounds, respiratory infections or colonisations with coughing and 
expectoration and on the consequences for adjacent patients should 
transmission occur. This latter factor would, for example, make isolation of 
an MRSA patient more likely on a ward where complex surgery was 
undertaken e. g. orthopaeclic implant surgery. If these risk assessments 
were valid then it is reasonable to consider'that those index cases who were 
risk-assessed by the infection control nurse or doctor as 'requiring isolation' 
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would pose a significantly greater risk for MRSA transmission; however this 
factor was only significant, both in univariate and multivariate analysis, for 
the outcome 'of MRSA from any of the up to three swabs taken from each 
contact, described as 'MRSA positive at any time". It is difficult to identify a 
plausible mechanism for this apparent relationship; it could be proposed that, 
in some cases, MRSA was acquired from the index case prior to that 
individual being identified as having MRSA but although 17 contacts who 
had MRSA identified from a swab taken on day 0 had an isolate that was 
indistinguishable from that of the putative index case, it is not possible to 
identify which of these individuals acquired MRSA from the other or whether 
both have acquired MRSA from another, unidentified source. 
Although 'presence of a nasogastric tube' has been identified previously as a 
risk factor for MRSA acquisition 83 87 88 this has been only in a univariate 
analysis, this is the first report of the presence of a nasogastric tube as an 
independent risk factor using multivariate analysis; however there are 
reports of enteral feeding as an independent risk factor 82 99 and it is likely 
that at least some of the patients identified as receiving enteral feeding will 
have done so via a nasogastric tube. It may be that previous studies that 
identified enteral feeding as a risk factor were confounded due to the 
nasogastric tube being the risk factor rather than the feeding per se. It is 
plausible for nasogastric tubes to present an increased risk of MRSA 
acquisition, placed as they are in a major site for colonisation by MRSA, 
it 
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may be that the presence of a foreign body in the nare increases the risk of 
adhesion and persistence of MRSA and, possibly, MSSA. 
The finding that 'enteral feeding' was an independent risk factor for acquired 
MRSA, though supported by previous studies as described above, needs to 
be interpreted with caution. The number of contacts who had enteral feeding 
was very small (2/222) and detailed examination of the statistical model 
strongly suggests that one case had an undue influence on the overall 
model. It is very likely that this finding is a statistical anomaly. 
Damage to skin integrity due to, for example pressure ulcers or 
dermatological conditions is recognised as a risk factor for MRSA acquisition 
and persistence 
74 83 97 99 100 
and the results of this study support this in 
finding that a contact suffering from a dermatological disorder such as 
eczema or psoriasis for example was an independent risk factor for them 
acquiring MRSA where the isolate was indistinguishable from that of the 
index case; again the number of cases is very small and though there is no 
statistical reason to suspect that the model is invalid, the result should be 
interpreted with caution. 
There are some limitations to the study to consider; because of the nature of 
the study design, in effect a 'natural experiment', the index cases were not 
randomised to isolation or no isolation, this creates a risk of selection bias in 
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the study. To overcome this, data on potential confounders, identified from 
the literature, were collected and included in the analysis and regression 
analysis used to control for their potential effects. 
292293 
Performance bias would describe differences in the care or management of 
patients included in the study, some aspects of 'performance' e. g. antibiotic 
prescription and length of stay, were included in the data collection and 
analysis, however others such as bed occupancy and workload and in 
particular the quality of the compliance with isolation precautions were not. It 
is a weakness of the study that there was no measure of the compliance with 
contact or barrier precautions for either those index cases who were 
isolated in single rooms or those who were managed using contact 
precautions in an open bay; however such observational study was beyond 
the scope and the means of this study. It is likely from the literature and from 
anecdotal experience that compliance was at best sub-optimal and very 
likely poor. It is interesting to note that despite this likelihood the proportion 
of directly attributable MRSA transmissions was very low. 
Another important weakness is the lack of information regarding what has 
been described as 'colonisation pressure' 95 (i. e. the proportion of patients in 
the ward who are known to be colonised with MRSA). The study setting did 
not, at the time of the study, practise admission screening routinely on any 
patients, so it is likely, and borne out by the numbers of MRSA results 
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identified at day 0, that there were patients on the ward with undetected 
MRSA colonisation. There is however no reason to suspect, given that the 
study was prospective with contemporary controls, that this would result in a 
systematic bias. 
Detection bias describes a situation in which the assessment of the outcome 
of the study is conducted in an unequal or biased manner between the two 
groups being studied. The outcome of this study was MRSA acquisition and 
it is possible for two reasons that some cases of MRSA acquisition were not 
detected during this study; firstly only nasal swabs were taken and these 
were plated directly onto agar without enrichment and secondly the 
maximum follow up period was fourteen days (in practice, only a small 
proportion of contacts remained in hospital for fourteen days and follow up 
was usually until discharge or transfer). The use of nasal swabs without 
enrichment was a pragmatic choice based on anecdotal experience of 
point-prevalence surveys, there is a lack of high-quality evidence on the 
optimal strategy for identification of MRSA colonisation 163 however nasal 
screening alone can identify > 90% of colonised individua IS 
279 
and is 
considerably less intrusive than swabbing multiple sites which may have 
caused patients to refuse their consent. Again there is no reason to suspect 
that this approach would have caused a systematic bias. 
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There is a possibility that the study may be prone to attrition bias, i. e. 
differential loss to follow-up between the two groups. There were a number 
of contacts who could not be followed up after their initial day 0 swab 
because of discharge or transfer, these were evenly distributed between the 
two groups but there were more contacts, who could not be included in the 
analysis, whose index case was risk-assessed as needing isolation and also 
more who had dermatology conditions. It is possible that some of these 
could have gone on to acquire MRSA but importantly this group (i. e. those 
with additional risk factors for acquisition) were evenly distributed between 
index cases who were isolated and those who were not. 
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6. Conclusions and recommendations 
6.1. Conclusions 
There is a general and anecdotal perception, as demonstrated by the 
description from the only UK guidance on isolation, of a recommendation to 
isolate as 'a council of perfection', that 'failure to isolate' is significant 
problem in NHS hospitals. This is the first study to quantify such failure 
prospectively. The results are disturbing and, if extrapolated to the NHS as 
whole, imply a systematic failure to apply what is considered i standard 
practice' in the control of HCAl. From the available evidence, and from 
anecdotal knowledge, there is little reason to believe these findings would 
not be broadly similar in other NHS hospitals. Newer hospitals with 
increased numbers of single rooms are being built but it will be many years 
before the overall provision of single rooms is greatly improved beyond the 
current situation. 
There is no doubt that, under the current circumstances, many patients are 
being placed at some, albeit unquantifiable, risk of exposure to pathogens. 
What is apparent from these data is that the demand for isolation in a single 
room facility in hospitals is highly varied and the overall proportion of beds as 
single rooms in a hospital is unlikely to give sufficient detail as to the 
adequacy of provision. NHS hospitals need to consider the need for, and 
provision of, single rooms on the basis of specialities and even individual 
un its. 
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Debate continues as to the optimum provision of accommodation in single 
rooms in new hospitals and major refurbishments but the current guidance 
that at least 50% of beds should be provided as single rooms will, given 
these results, eventually go some way to closing the gap between demand 
and provision. 
There is an inherent tension between the finding that there is a significant 
correlation between failing to isolate patients risk-assessed as requiring 
isolation and clinical MRSA incidence, and the relative lack of MRSA 
transmission from index cases who were not isolated to their immediate 
neighbours. Correlation does not demonstrate cause and effect and it should 
not be inferred from it, there is more than one plausible explanation for this 
finding, not least that increasing numbers of cases of MRSA may lead to 
'failure to isolate' as opposed to being caused by It. 
Evidence for the effectiveness of isolation in a single room in preventing the 
spread of organisms spread primarily by the contact route is limited and 
based in large part on unplanned and method olog ica I ly-wea k studies. This 
study found, in a cohort of patients in the immediate vicinity of index cases 
from whose clinical specimens MRSA had been identified that there was little 
apparent transmission of MRSA and that such transmission was not 
decreased through isolation of the index patient. These findings do not in 
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themselves prove that isolation is ineffective per se as there are other 
plausible explanations for its potential effect in reducing transmission; 
nevertheless they make a significant contribution to the debate. 
6.2. Recommendations 
NHS hospitals should review their provision of single rooms in light of these 
findings and consider how their provision on a speciality and individual unit 
basis can be best managed to meet demand. 
Those responsible for the commissioning and design of new hospitals and 
major refurbishments should take account of these findings which support 
current recommendations that a minimum 50% of beds should be provided 
as single rooms. In addition, consideration should be given to the potential 
demand for isolation in individual specialties and units and, where 
necessary, additional isolation capacity should be provided. 
Further research is needed into the effectiveness of isolation in a single 
room in the prevention of MRSA transmission. Specifically, a large, 
randomised intervention study of isolation vs. standard or contact 
precautions (without isolation in a single room). Such a study would need to 
be randomised at the ward or unit level and would need to include data 
collection on potential confounding variables, in particular: antibiotic usage, 
workload and the quality of the standard and isolation precautions used. 
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Given the lack of data to demonstrate the efficacy of isolation in this context 
such a study would appear to be ethically acceptable; however the current 
climate of raised public concern about HCAl could present significant 
difficulties. 
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7. Publications and presentations 
Wigglesworth NA & Wilcox MH (2006) Prospective Evaluation of Hospital 
isolation Room Capacity. Journal of Hospital Infection; 63,156-161 
Wigglesworth NA & Wilcox MH (2006) How Does Success or Failure to 
Isolate Patients Affect the Control of Meticillin Resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus? Poster Presentation, 6th International Conference of the Hospital 
Infection Society. Abstract no. P4.10 
Prospective evaluation of the effects of isolation on the transmission risk for 
MRSA, Wigglesworth NA & Wilcox MH in preparation 
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8. List of abbreviations used in the text 
CA-MRSA Community acquired MRSA (See MRSA) 
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Cl (95%) Confidence intervals 
DNA Deoxyribonucleic acid 
ENT Ear, nose and throat 
ESBL Extended spectrum P-lactamase 
EUR Euro (E) 
GISA Glycopeptide intermediately resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus 
HAI Hospital acquired infection 
HCAI Healthcare-associated infection 
HDU High dependency unit 
ICU Intensive care unit 
LGI Leeds General Infirmary 
LIPS Lewisham Isolation Priority System 
LOS Length of stay 
MDRO Multi-drug resistant organism 
mic Minimum inhibitory concentration 
MLST Multi-locus sequence typing 
MRSA Meticillin resistant S. aureus 
MSSA Meticillin sensitive S. aureus 
NHS National Health Service 
OR Odds ratio 
PCR Polymerase chain reaction 
PFGE Pulse field gel electrophoresis 
PVL Panton - Valentine leukocidin 
RCT Randomised controlled trial 
RR Relative risk 
RTD Routine test dilution 
SCCmec Staphylococcal chromosomal cassette 
TE TRIS-HCL, EDTA (buffer) 
TEN TRIS-HCL, EDTA, Sodium Chloride (buffer) 
TISA Teicoplanin intermediately resistant S. aureus 
USA United States of America 
USID United States Dollar 
UK United Kingdom 
VAP Ventilator associated pneumonia 
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List of abbreviations concluded 
VISA Vancomycin intermediately resistant S. aureus 
VRE Vancomycin resistant enterococci 
VRSA Vancomycin resistant S. aureus 
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Appendix A: 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) grading of evidence to 
support recommendations' 92 
- Category la. Strongly recommended for implementation and 
strongly supported by well-designed experimental, clinical, or 
epidemiological studies. 
Category 1 b. Strongly recommended for implementation and 
strongly supported by certain experimental, clinical or 
epidemiological studies and a strong theoretical rationale. 
Category 1c Required for implementation, as mandated by 
federal or state regulation or standard. [The UK equivalent is to 
operate within EU or UK Health & Safety Legislation]. 
Category 2. Suggested for implementation and supported by 
suggestive clinical or epidemiological studies or a theoretical 
rationale. 
No recommendation. Unresolved issue. Practises for which 
insufficient evidence exists or no consensus regarding efficacy 
exists. 
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Appendix B: The Lewisham Isolation Priority System: Scoring Grid and 
notes (reproduced from Masterton et a/. 
219) 
CRITERIA CLASSIFICATION SCORE COMMENTS 
A CDP category 2 5 
3 10 
4 40 
Route Air-borne 15 
Droplet 10 
Contact 5 Includes faecal-oral 
transmission 
Blood-borne 0 
Evidence of transmission Published evidence 10 
Consensus or high 
likelihood 
5 
No consensus or 
unlikely 
0 
No evidence -10 
Significant Resistance Yes 5 Such as MRSA, GRE, etc. 
No 0 
High Susceptibility of other 
patients with serious 
consequences 
Yes 10 Specific for various 
infections and patient 
populations 
No 0 
Prevalence Sporadic 0 
Endemic -5 This reflects the burden of 
infection in the hospital and 
cohort measures are more 
applicable 
Epidemic -5 See above 
Dispersal High risk 10 Only for contact and 
droplet 
transmission, e. g. eczema, 
faecal incontinence, 
tracheostomy, etc. 
Medium. risk 5 
Low risk 0 
TOTAL SCORE 
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Appendix B concluded 
Category of priority for 
isolation Score 
Low 0-20 
Medium 21 -39 
High 40-50 
1. Advisory Committee of Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) Classification 
of Pathogens: The ACDP classification provides an acknowledged 
system of classifying organisms based on their transmissibility, 
pathogenicity and our ability to protect against or treat individual 
infections. 
2. The probable route of transmission: Air-borne infections are those 
likely to spread readily if not isolated; blood-borne infections are least 
likely to do so. 
3. Evidence for transmission- Although (1) and (2) may suggest 
transmission, the emphasis placed on evidence-based medicine now 
supports a requirement to demonstrate that transmission of specific 
infections has indeed occurred in hospitals. 
4. Occurrence of infection in the hospital: The incidence or prevalence of 
an infection/colonisation in a hospital is frequently a consideration 
when deciding whether or not to isolate a patient. In a sporadic 
infection, isolation of a patient will have a higher priority than in an 
endemic or epidemic situation. 
5. Antibiotic resistance: Emergence of antibiotic resistant bacteria is one 
of the principal causes for the increased demand on isolation facilities. 
6. Susceptibility of other patients: When deciding whether or not to 
isolate a case, the presence of a susceptible patient population 
promotes the isolation of the potential source of sepsis. 
7. Dispersal characteristics of patient: Whilst transmissibility of various 
infections have been addressed in 1,2, and 3, it is well recognised 
that for a given infection certain patients present greater transmission 
hazards than others. 
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Appendix C: Full article appraisal criteria from Cooper et al. 197 (chapter 3, 
page 19) 
For each article, the reviewers were first required to answer the following 
questions: 
1. Is this a report of an MRSA outbreak or endemic MRSA? 
2. Is it a hospital setting? 
3. Is an isolation strategy or policy mentioned? 
4. Is there a relevant outcome in the form of MRSA transmission data for 
patients (including colonisation or infection with MRSA)? 
If the answer to any of these questions was 'no', the paper was rejected. 
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Appendix D: The Charlson Comorbidity IndeX280 
f% L 
%, mirmon in aex 
Factor 
Myocardial Infarct 
Weight Tick Score 
Congestive heart failure 
Peripheral vascular disease 
Cerebrovascular disease 
Dementia 
Chronic Pulmonary Disease 
Connective Tissue Disease 
Ulcer disease 
Mild liver disease 1 
Diabetes 
Hemiplegia 2 
Moderate or sever renal disease 2 
Diabetes with end organ damage 2 
Any tumour 2 
Leukaemia 2 
Lymphorna 2 
Moderate or sever liver disease 2 





MI & CCF - documented diagnosis 
PV disease - intermittent claudication, bypass for arterial insufficiency, gangrene, 
Acute AAA or thoracic aneurysm > 6cm 
Cerebrovascular disease = CVA with minor or no residue, TlAs 
Diabetes - end organ damage = retinopathy, neuropathy or nephropathy 
Renal - dialysis, post transplant, or serum creatinine >3 mg% (265 pmol/L) 
Liver disease - Mild = chronic hepatitis or cirrhosis, moderate or severe includes 
portal hypertension/ variceal bleeding. 
Lymphoma - includes Hodgkin's, lymphosarcoma, Waldenstroms 
macro-globulinaernia, myeloma and other lymphomas. 
Leukaemia acute & chronic myeloid and lymphocytic and polycythaemia vera. 
Tumour - last 5 years Connective tissue disease - Lupus, polymyositis, mixed connective tissue 
disease 
and moderate to severe RA 
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Appendix E: The Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust policy for the infection control management of MRSA 
The Leeds Teaching Hospitals 
NHS Trust 
LTHT Infection Control Policies 
MRSA 
"MRSA" stands for Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus aureus; it is a 
bacterium that is resistant to certain antibiotics including flucloxacillin and all 
cephalosporins. MRSA is not a significant risk to healthy people, including 
health care workers and visitors, but can cause serious infection in 
vulnerable patients. Such infections can be very difficult and expensive to 
treat. 
This policy covers the majority of situations in which patients with MRSA 
have to be managed. However some specialist units and areas within the 
LTHT will have specific arrangements that have been agreed with the 
Infection Control Team. A copy of these arrangements should be kept in the 
Infection Control Manual on the wards/department concerned. 
Key Points 
Hand hygiene is the most important measure in preventing the 
spread of MRSA. 
Infection control management of patients with MRSA must be 
based on an assessment of the risk of spread to other patients. 
Patients who present an increased risk of spreading MRSA will 
need to be managed in Source Isolation. (See LTHT Source 
Isolation Policy). 
Patients admitted with a history of MRSA colonisation/ infection 
may need to be admitted into a single room, particularly if signs of 
clinical infection (i. e. risk of spread of MRSA to other patients). 
Equipment and the hospital environment can be involved in spread 
of MRSA if cleaning or decontamination is inadequate. 
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Screening f or MRSA wi II only be carried out, af ter arrangement 
with the Infection Control Team. 
Topical agents to reduce MRSA carriage may be used in certain 
patient groups or following advice from Infection Control. 
MRSA colonisation or infection should never be a contrai nd i cation to nursing or residential care discharge. 
Where is MQSA found? 
MRSA, like other Staph. aureus strains, colonises moist or broken skin, in 
particular the axillae and groin areas. The most common carriage site of MRSA is the nose; it can also be found occasionally in the throat. MRSA 
can cause a wide variety of infections including skin and wound infections 
and bacteraemia. 
How does MRSA spread? 
MRSA is most commonly spread on the hands of health care workers. 
Hospital equipment can be a route of spread if not adequately 
decontaminated between patients. (See LTHT Decontamination of 
Hospital Equipment Including Medical Devices) 
Patients with MRSA are likely to contaminate inanimate objects and 
the hospital environment in their vicinity. Subsequently this 
contamination can be transferred to other patients either directly, or 
via staff hands. 
What do you do ff a patient is found to have MRSA? 
Infection control management of patients from whom MRSA has been 
isolated must be based on risk assessment. (This is the assessment of the 
risk of MRSA being spread from such patients to others and the risk MRSA 
acquisition to those patients). 
Staff caring for the patient should undertake the risk assessment. Help and 
advice is available from Infection Contro I/M ic ro biology. 
The factors that need to be taken into account when assessing the risk of 
transferring MRSA to other patients include: 
The site or specimen from which MRSA has been isolated (e. g. 
wound swab, sputum etc). 
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Whether the patient has clinical evidence of an infection (i. e. has associated symptoms) or is colonised (i. e. is asymptomatic). The environment in which the patient is being managed (i. e. the susceptibility of other patients to MRSA infection). 
Examples of higher risk include: leaking wounds, drains in situ, exfoliating 
skin problems and coughing and expectorating patients (in sputum MRSA 
positives). 
Part of the risk assessment includes the assessment of the risk of untoward 
outcome, to other patients. For this reason we can categorise patient areas 
into the following: 
Hospital wards and departments can be broadly divided into 3 categories; 
1. High risk - Critical Care areas eg ICU's, HDU, SJUH Liver Unit, 
Bone Marrow Transplant Unit, Renal Units, Orthopaedic and Vascular 
surgery. 
2. Medium risk - "surgical" in-patient wards e. g. G. 1. surgery 
Oncoiogy/Haernatology wards 
3. Low risk - general "medical" or Care of the Elderly wards and 
outpatient areas. (Low risk does not mean no risk, advice on 
management of patients in these areas will be given by Infection 
Control/Clinical Microbiology). 
Depending on the outcome of the risk assessment the patient will either 
need to be in Source Isolation (see Source Isolation Policy) or may be 
managed using Universal Infection Control Precautions (see Universal 
Infection Control Policy). 
Examples of risk assessments (NS these are only examples 
- every case will need Individual assessment) 
1. A patient with MRSA in sputum who is coughing and expectorating would 
present a high risk of transferring the organism to others and will need to 
be isolated in any acute care environment. 
2. A patient with MRSA in urine who is not catheterised, is continent and 
has no symptoms is very unlikely to present a risk to others and would 
not need isolating except in very high risk areas e. g. ICU. 
3. A patient who has a superficial wound infection which is leaking slightly 
and requires dressing presents a moderate risk to others and may be 
isolated depending on the care environment e. g. isolation would be 
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required in a "surgical" or critical care environment but not necessarily in a "medical" environment. 
What about endinq source isolation? 
The decision to discontinue source isolation will be made using the 
same principles of risk assessment as described above i. e. as the 
circumstances of the patient, the infection or colonisation or the 
environment change, the need for continuing isolation will need to be 
re-assessed. For example a patient with a previously leaking wound 
that has now dried up may no longer require source isolation. 
Screening swabs/cultures for MRSA status play little or no role in 
such decisions and should not therefore be undertaken routinely. 
The Infection Control Team is available to discuss, and 
assist with risk assessment. 
Are there any specific precautions for MRSA? 
Most of the necessary precautions for managing patients with MRSA 
can be found in the Source Isolation, Universal Infection Control 
Precautions and Hand Hygiene policies. As with all patients the most 
important infection control procedure is hand washing and/or use of 
an alcohol hand rub. 
Additional measures may be required for certain patients e. g. specific 
peri-operative prophylaxis. These or similar strategies should not be 
attempted without prior discussion with Infection Control Team or 
Clinical Microbiologist. 
Should any topical preparations be used to reduce the carriage of 
MRSA? 
In certain circumstances it will be necessary to try and reduce 
carriage of MRSA using topical agents (i. e. "Mupirocin" nasal ointment 
and "Aquasept" bathing). 
The topical control regimen (see appendix A-) should be used in 
patients in whom MRSA is isolated in the following areas: 
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1. Patients should be placed on the topical control regimen on admission if 
admitted to general adult ITU/Neuro ITU and general surgical HDU. The 
following criteria will be applied to identify those patients who require the 
topical control regimen: 
Patients age 65 years and over. 
Patients who have had surgery or trauma this 
admission. 
Patients who have known MRSA in the past. 
As previously stated part of the risk assessment includes the assessment of 
the risk of untoward outcome, to other patients. For this reason we can 
categorise patients on ITU/Neuro and general surgical HDU who are 
neutropaenic or admitted from a haernatology or oncology unit as high risk. 
These patients should also receive the topical regimen (see appendix A) to 
reduce potential acquisition. 
2. In all Renal, Liver, Haematology, Orthopaedic, Vascular surgery and 
Cardiothoracic surgery wards, GI surgery and ENT surgery, the topical 
control regimen should be commenced if MRSA is found on a clinical 
specimen. 
3. Additional measures may be required for certain patients' e. g. specific 
peri-operative prophylaxis. These or similar strategies should not be 
attempted without prior discussion with Infection Control / Clinical 
Microbiologist. 
4. Patients should be given one course only of the topical control 
regimen per LTHT in patient stay. (This includes all previous use 
including prophylaxis use. ) If you require advice please contact 
Infection 
Control/Clinical Microbiologist. This issue is important in minimising the 
risk of emergence of resistance to mupirocin. 
Should patients be screened for MRSA? 
Screening for MRSA will be carried out, ONLY after arrangement with 
the 
Infection Control Team. 
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ýat about admitting a patient who is known to have, or 
ve had MRSA? 
Patients who have had MRSA in the past are likely to remain 
colonised and may present a risk of infection to others. 
If a patient is admitted from home or another health care provider with known MRSA (or a history of MRSA). A risk assessment should be 
undertaken as soon as possible and the patient managed 
accordingly. If no single room is available a risk assessment should 
be undertaken and the patient managed using Universal Precautions 
and Source Isolation around the bed space if appropriate. (infection 
Control/Microbiology can be contacted for advice). 
If patients are transferred within the LTHT, the ward/area who are 
transferring the patient must discuss the risk assessment and 
management of the patient with the receiving ward. 
hat measures are needed on discharge? 
If the patient is to be discharged to the care of a nursing, residential 
home or district nurse then a copy of the community discharge sheet 
[see appendix B] should accompany the patient. 
Colonisation/ Infection with MRSA should never be a 
contraindication to nursing home/residential care. 
If the patient is being transferred to another hospital trust/health care 
provider the management of the patient should be discussed with 
the receiving facility before the patient is transferred. 
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Appendix A]: Topical Regimen for the Control of MRSA Carriage 
pirocin 2% nasal ointment (BýLct! rEogLanl 
y with a cotton wool swab or finger to the nasal nares 2 times per day for 5 days. Wash and dry hands thoroughly before and after each application. 
iseptic body wash 
dosan 2% (Aquasept) 
ieous Poviclone Iodine (Betadine) skin cleanser 4% 
Drhexidine gluconate 4% (Hibiscrub) 
ly for 5 days. 
maximum effect these products should be used neat as a liquid 
p/shampoo. 
ztions for use (also see individual product directions) 
Wet skin before application. 
Using as a liquid soap/shampoo, apply the chosen product from head to toe. 
Wash vigorously with particular attention to the groin/axilla regions. 
Rinse thoroughly. 
Dry, using clean towels. 
ier topical agents may be required but the following should only be used 
-eguested by Infection Control/Microbiology. 
-iseptic powder (Sterzac or_CX powder) 
fly like talc following bathing, especially to axilla and groin areas. 
rsodyl mouthwash 
the mouthwash 4 times per day. If present, dentures must be removed and cleaned using 
mouthwash. 
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ppendix BI: Guidelines on the Control of Staphylococcus aureus 
(including MRSA) in Patients Discharged from Hospital. 
iftions 
Colonisation: when bacteria that are able to cause infection are isolated from a non- infected site, e. g. Staphylococcus aureus in the nose. 
Infection: is the reaction to microbes lodging and multiplying in the tissues, e. g. 
abscesses, wound infections or chest infections. 
: )ugh these guidelines are to be used with patients discharged with an infection, Nke may not 
ys be aware of colonisation or even infection. Therefore, constant good practice. 
cularly hand hygiene, is necessary to prevent the spread of microbes. 
vidual assessment 
y suspected infected patient should be assessed so that their treatment can be determined 
ie relevant medical staff, in conjunction with the microbiologist. 
dwashing 
-ssary after contact with infected people or contaminated articles: paper tov'els must be 
[ to dry hands. Alcohol handrub should be available, and its use understood. 
tective clothing 
, le-use searnfree gloves should be used for handling contaminated dressings, linen. 
, pment etc. Single-use plastic aprons to be used for close contact with infected persons or 
r immediate environment. 
ation 
usually needed outside hospital. 
! ptic technique 
be used when dealing with wounds and for other aseptic procedures. 
Me 
-cted materials, e. g. dressings, to be disposed of as clinical waste. 
ien 
low usual laundry procedures. 
ucation and prevention 
ff should apply universal infection control precautions to all patients. 
mmunication 
transfer or discharge, advice about any infection should 
be included in the information 
en to other providers of health care. 
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ýpendix F: The Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust policy for source lation 
The Leeds Teaching Hospitals 
NHS Trust 
LTHT Infection Control Policies 
Source Isolation 
irce isolation is the physical separation of one patient from another, in order to 
vent spread of infection. Universal Infection Control Precautions must be 
; erved at all times with all patients, including those in isolation. 
1. How do you decide when isolation is needed? 
The decision to isolate a patient should be based on the infection risk, 
and taken preferably after discussion with the Infection Control Team. 
A risk analysis approach should be carried out. For example, patients 
with poor hygiene are more likely to cause cross-infection. 
Isolated patients may experience more anxiety and depression. Isolation 
may hamper rehabilitation. To reduce these risks, preparatory 
information should be given wherever possible: 
" Explanation of the nature of disease or organism, symptoms and 
treatment. 
" Control methods and their rationale with advice for patients regarding 
their responsibility and their adoption of correct measures. 
Regular assessment and evaluation of the situation, in conjunction with 
the Infection Control Team is necessary to decide if isolation of the 
patient remains the most appropriate form of care. 
The patient must be nursed in a single room with a wash basin and 
preferably an en-suite toilet. If an en-suite toilet is not available, a 
commode for sole use of the isolated patient should be kept in the 
isolation room for the duration of the patient's stay. 
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Ensure the isolation room door is closed at all times apart from necessary entrances and exits, when airborne infection risk is present. 
Limit the number of staff entering the isolation room. Reducing the 
number of staff who come into contact with the patient will further reduce the risk of spreading the infection. 
If isolation is for a childhood diseases (i. e. infections such as measles, 
mumps, rubella, for which routine vaccination occurs, or chicken pox), it is preferable that only staff who are immune to the disease attend to the 
patient (see specific guidelines, or if necessary, discuss with the Infection 
Control Team). 
2. How to prepare the roorn. 
Make sure that all unnecessary equipment and furniture are removed 
from the room, this will facilitate cleaning and limit the items, which may 
become contaminated. 
It is important that the equipment in the room is dedicated to the isolated 
patient. 
Do not overstock the room, as equipment that cannot be cleaned will be 
disposed of. 
All personal belongings and equipment should be washable, cleanable or 
disposable. 
Discourage the patient from keeping unnecessary belongings in the 
room, but remember the need for psychological care of the patient whilst 
he/she is in isolation. 
Place isolation sign on the door (see appendix). The sign is designed to 
inform anyone intending to enter the room of the situation, but not label 
the patient as being infectious. 
Set up a trolley/table/shelf outside the room with single use gloves and 
aprons. Ensure that alcohol hand rub/gel is available within the 
constraints of COSHH. 
Keep charts and kardex OUTSIDE the room to reduce the risk of 
contamination. 
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Make sure the hand wash basin is stocked with appropriate hand hygiene product (discuss with the Infection Control Team if necessary) and pa per towels. 
Place yellow clinical waste bag, sharps bin, red linen bag, and alg nate liner in the room. 
3. How to care f or the patient 
Universal precautions must be used at all times. (please see LTHT 
universal precaution policy) 
Hand hygiene 
Strict and thorough hand washing is mandatory after any direct contact 
with the patient or his/her immediate environment e. g. bed making, 
moving the patient, cleaning etc. Don't forget to cleanse hands after 
removing gloves. 
Soap and running water is adequate for hand hygiene, alcohol hand 
rub/gel should be used as a supplement once outside the room. (See 
Hand Hygiene Policy) 
Encourage the patient to cleanse their hands before eating and after 
going to the toilet. 
Protective clothing 
Wear single use gloves for direct patient contact, contact with body fluids, 
potentially infectious material or when touching items in the environment 
which may be contaminated. 
Wear single use plastic apron for close patient contact (e. g. bed bathing, 
moving patient), when in close contact with potentially infected material 
(e. g. bed making), and any other situation when contamination of clothing 
may occur. 
Remove apron, then gloves and discard promptly into yellow clinical 
waste bag. Wash and dry hands thoroughly after having removed 
protective clothing and before leaving the isolation room. Use the alcohol 
hand rub/gel out side the room. 
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Except in certain circumstances there is little evidence that the use of masks contributes to preventing cross infection. If in doubt, discuss with the Infection Control Team. 
Protection of eyes, nose and mouth may be necessary if blood/body fluid 
sprays or splashes are possible. The following options are available: 
safety spectacles, goggles, masks and visors. Visors usually offer the best protection. 
Disposal of body f luids, waste and linen 
Dispose of all excreta promptly, preferably by discarding it directly into 
the bedpan washer/macerator or the patient's own toilet. 
Use protective cover for bed pans/urinals/vomit bowls when transporting 
to the sluice room. 
Protective clothing used within the isolation room may be worn to the 
sluice room, but discarded immediately into yellow clinical waste bag 
after disposal of excreta. 
Ensure thorough and frequent cleaning of the commode/toilet using 
sanitiser. 
Deal with any blood/body fluid spillage immediately, wearing appropriate 
protective clothing and disinfecting the spillage with 10,000 pprn chlorine 
releasing solution. 
Place waste contaminated with blood/body fluids directly into the yellow 
clinical waste bag in the isolation room. As soon as these bags are 2/3 
full the bags must be tied in a swan neck and a tag attached indicating 
place of origin. The bags must be removed from the room to the waste 
storage area and a new yellow clinical waste bag placed in the isolation 
room. 
All linen within the isolation room must be placed into red alginate bags 
and red linen bags for safe transportation to the laundry. This includes 
unused linen when the room is no longer required for isolation purposes. 
Double bagging of clinical waste and linen is unnecessary, as studies 
have shown that the outer surface of the bags does not become 
significantly contaminated. 
Place all disposable sharps in the sharps bin immediately after use. 
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Crockery/cutlery 
All crockery/cutlery must be decontaminated in a dishwasher with a final rinse temperature of 800C. 
Washing by hand is inadequate without a final rinse for one minute at 80'C. 
* Disposable crockery and cutlery should not be used. 
Bathing 
To reduce the risk of cross-infection, patients with infections must be 
bathed last. 
Always clean the bath with sanitising powder after any patient has used 
it, this method of disinfection is fine after infected patients. 
* Showers may be used and the same criteria as above used. 
bressings 
All wounds should be dressed in the isolation room using aseptic 
technique. 
Cleaning 
The Infection Control Team will advise on the frequency of cleanIng the 
isolation rooms and solutions to be used. 
The nurse in charge must inform the locality supervisor of the need for 
isolation cleaning. 
The vacated bed, mattress and bed area on the ward must be thoroughly 
cleaned before it can be reoccupied. 
Make sure that separate cleaning equipment is being used to clean the 
isolation rooms. This equipment must be kept clean and dry within 
the room. The mop head must be removed and sent to the laundry 
after each use. 
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Isolation rooms should be cleaned last, after other rooms, bays and 
general areas on the ward 
Single use gloves and aprons must be worn when cleaning the isolation 
rooms and hands washed before leaving the room. 
Special attention must be given to all horizontal surfaces and frequently touched surfaces, such as door handies/door push plates, nurse call 
system, toilet areas and sink taps. 
A thorough terminal clean must be done when the room is no longer 
required for isolation purposes. Curtains and walls need only be washed 
if visibly soiled. 
Investigat ions/vis its to other departments 
* Ideally, investigations should be performed in the isolation room. 
If visits to other departments/wards are unavoidable, please contact the 
Infection Control Team. 
The receiving department should also be contacted to ensure that 
adequate precautions are taken. 
In principle the Patient from the isolation room should be last on the list to 
minimise contact with other patients. The same precautions taken on the 
ward should be carried out in the department. 
Transfers to other wards/health care institutions 
These should only take place if unavoidable, please discuss with the 
Infection Control Team. 
* The receiving ward must be informed and a single room arranged. 
The Infection Control Team will inform the relevant Infection Control 
Nurse about the transfer. 
The patient's health should take priority over the infection problem, e. g. 
if 
the patient is required to be transferred to ITU or CCU. 
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In the case of death 
In order to protect the mortuary staff; follow the LTHT policy for handling deceased patients with known infection. 
What about visitors/parents/carers? 
Explain the reason for isolation, maintaining confidentiality at all times, ( if 
available, give information leaflet on specific infection) 
Advise on hand hygiene and/or other precautions. Encourage visitors not 
to have contact with other patients on the ward. 
Visitors need only wear protective clothing if they are going to have close 
contact with the patient, eg. helping with patient's physical care, or if 
otherwise advised. 
Discuss with the Infection Control Team, or see specific disease policy to 
ascertain if visitors should be excluded due to particular susceptibility. 
5. When can isolation precautions be stopped? 
* When the patient is no longer at risk of spreading infection to others. 
Frequent assessment and evaluation of the patient's situation is 
therefore important. 
Some specific disease policies give criteria on when isolation precautions 
can be stopped. 
e If in doubt, discuss with the Infection Controi Team. 
Make sure the vacated room is thoroughly cleaned. Use the same 
solutions and equipment that have been used for isolation cleaning. 
All 
equipment and belongings must be cleaned before being brought out of 
the room or used again. Any unused disposable items, which may 
be 
contaminated and cannot be cleaned, must be disposed of. 
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